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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation focuses on using organizational capabilities and the anticipated 
economic payoff from innovation to explain and predict the dynamics of a technological 
laggard's behavior. The firm capabilities research that focuses on organizational capabilities 
suggests that a technological laggard has to innovate, while the competitive dynamics research 
focuses on the anticipated economic payoff that a technological laggard can gain from 
innovating. Together, the central hypothesis in this dissertation is that a firm is more likely to 
remain a technological laggard if doing so enables the firm to better utilize its current 
organizational capabilities, and if it anticipates a better economic payoff by remaining a 
technological laggard than by becoming a technological leader in innovation. A technological 
laggard chooses to move to the technology frontier when it has the capabilities to realize the 
anticipated economic payoff. Using panel data from the flat panel display industry for the 1991-
2008 period, I empirically corroborate the hypothesis. This dissertation provides a more 
complete picture than the extant literature of a technological laggard's behavior by combining the 
firm capabilities research with competitive dynamics research.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The large volume of research on competition at the technology frontier
1
 (Banbury & 
Mitchell, 1995; Jovanovic & Macdonald, 1994; Reinganum, 1983) belies a simple empirical 
reality--at any point of time, most firms lag behind their industry's technology frontier. Indeed, 
few if any firms are consistently at the technology frontier and many firms spend the most of 
their existence behind the technology frontier. Despite this ubiquity, we understand little about 
the strategies of technological laggards (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997). This dissertation focuses on 
one critical decision technological laggards must make--whether to attempt to advance to a new 
position, and if so, whether to move partway towards the technology frontier, or whether to move 
all the way to the technology frontier
2
.  
                                                 
1
 de Figueiredo & Teece define the technological frontier as "a component or service being procured which enlists 
technology that is not ubiquitously employed in the industry. Frontier technologies are those leading edge 
innovations being incorporated into subsystems and components" (1996: 545, footnote 5). Thus, the technology 
frontier in this study represents the most advanced technology available in the market (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco 
& Sarkar, 2004; Christensen, 1997; de Figueiredo & Kyle, 2005).  
2
 In this dissertation I examine the technology advancements within the same technology trajectory (Dosi, 1982). 
The setting facilitating incremental technology advancement where a technological laggard to have three proposed 
strategic alternatives: (1) not move; (2) move towards; and (3) move to the technology frontier.  
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Figure 1. Patent counts by distance to the technology frontier.
 
Not all firms are equally capable of competing effectively at the technology frontier. 
Specifically, some firms may have difficulty developing their technological capabilities in such a 
timely manner that allows them to move to the technology frontier (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
Figure 1 illustrates flat panel makers' distance to the technology frontier with respect to their 
patent numbers, which are common proxies of firms’ technological capabilities (Hall, Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg, 2001; Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002). Some flat-panel display makers behind the 
technology frontier actually have more patents than those close to or at the technology frontier, 
suggesting that makers can and may strategically select a position in relation to the technology 
frontier (Khanna, 1995; Lerner, 1997). Indeed, Chen, Smith and Grimm have called for future 
studies that "explore the characteristics of the firms which initiate actions and the process by 
which competitors decide to respond," (1992:453). In additional to technological capabilities, a 
model that explains and predicts a firm's innovation behavior should include factors influencing 
its likelihood of taking and responding competitive actions.    
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1.1 Research Question 
In an attempt to respond to the issues raised above, this dissertation asks the central 
research question: What determines by how much, if at all, a technological laggard advances 
towards the technology frontier? I integrate the firm capabilities and competitive dynamics 
researches into a theoretical model in an effort to better understand the technology deployment 
decisions made by technological laggards (Cui, Calantone & Griffith, 2011; Ndofor, Sirmon & 
He, 2011). This integrated model seeks to address the theoretical gaps in each underlying 
literature. The firm capabilities research adopts an inward-looking focus, considering the focal 
firm's capabilities (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Mitchell & Shaver, 2003); 
while in contrast the competitive dynamics research which considers the focal firm's capabilities 
of giving and responding to competitive actions from the environment
3
. The development of 
competitive dynamics research has largely focused on a firm's level of competition awareness, 
and the resulting motivation to take competitive actions (Chen, 1996), leaving the effect of 
organizational capabilities on the focal firm’s competitive behavior largely unexamined. It is of 
theoretical importance to examinate the focal firm's organizational capabilities in a competitive 
environment. Because of the strategic interdependencies between the focal and rival firms, the 
strength of the focal firm's organizational capabilities is likely to for the most part be correlated 
with those of its rival firms'.   
The firm capabilities research posits that a technological laggard chooses a strategic 
move that can increases and enhance the utility of its existing organizational capabilities. 
Therefore, a technological laggard is likely to not move from its current position if remaining in 
the current position allows it to better utilize its organization capabilities. This proposition 
                                                 
3
 The external factors in this dissertation specifically refer to market and technological competition from rivalry.   
 4 
challenges the assumption widely held in the competitive dynamics research, which posits that 
an increasing level of competition induces a technological laggard to take actions, assuming that 
managers respond to the competition by initiating changes (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2011; 
Levinthal & March, 1993). But this assumption overlooks the fact that not moving can also be a 
strategic decision that enables a technological laggard to leverage its existing organizational 
capabilities, as suggested by the firm capabilities research.  
Through a model that combines the firm capabilities and the competitive dynamics 
research, I posit that a technological laggard's technology deployment decisions are contingent 
both on its organizational capabilities and its anticipated economic payoff. However, if a 
technological laggard is less than capable of managing the risks involved in moving to the 
technology frontier, it usually chooses not to move from its current position, or move towards the 
technology frontier. Being behind the technology frontier can sometimes enable a technological 
laggard to garner a significant economic payoff from time to time.  
The model in this dissertation is particularly useful in terms of explaining and predicting 
technology deployment decisions made by technological laggards. Technological laggards are 
made up of a group that is highly heterogeneous in their organizational capabilities; this group as 
a whole has exhibited a more diverse pattern of competition than has the technological leader 
(Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2012). Thus, to fully understand a technological laggard's 
technology deployment decision, it is necessary to include the heterogeneity that is also inherent 
in competitive actions that a technological laggard takes in addition to the heterogeneity in 
capabilities (Chatain, 2010; Lee, Kim & Lim, 2011).  
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Figure 2. The three strategic alternatives of a technological laggard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that technological laggards do innovate, the extant research literature 
rarely addresses innovation that mostly occurs behind the technology frontier. Figure 2 illustrates 
three strategic alternatives that are available to a technological laggard in the current dissertation 
with respect to its distance to the technology frontier: (1) to not move from its current position; (2) 
to move towards the technology frontier; (3) to move to the technology frontier
4
.   
1.2 Industry Setting and Research Design 
I begin this dissertation by posing the research question: “What determines by how much, 
if at all, a technological laggard advances towards the technology frontier?” I use data from the 
worldwide flat panel display industry for the following four reasons. First, the size of glass 
substrate, which is later divided into display panels, is a single dimension that can be used to 
defines a plant's generation in this industry, and thus will allow for a much greater precision in 
                                                 
4
 Moving to the technology frontier in this study represents two strategic actions--moving to and beyond the 
technology frontier. Although in practice the two moves are different, the extant theories cannot distinguish the two 
in developing hypotheses. Therefore, I combine these two moves and refer them as moving to the technology 
frontier. 
Technology frontier 
: Technological laggard's position before moving 
: Technological laggard's new position 
: Technological leaders 
Move toward 
 Not 
move 
       Move to 
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empirical testing. Second, it is widely accepted that plant generation is a measure of a firm's 
technological capabilities in the flat panel display industry, and the introduction of this measure 
can be viewed as a contribution to the extant research literature. Third, an across-the-board 
comparison of each firm' plant generations provides a clear identification as to who the 
technological leader and laggards are, and the distance between them, as measured in the 
generations of plants, lends itself as an empirical setting to examinate the behavior of 
technological laggards. Fourth, the product characteristics of display panels are nearly identical 
across the entire flat panel display industry. Due to the gradual and quite uniform 
transformations of products from inputs into outputs, there is high face validity in classifying 
technological laggards of the same plant generation into the same category (Vives, 2005). This 
consistent connection between inputs and outputs once again enhances the precision of the 
empirical testing. 
1.3 Contributions 
Technological capabilities alone may be insufficient to ensure a firm's performance, but a 
firm's capabilities to manage the competitive dynamics in its market can help it to improve its 
performance (Tsai, Su & Chen, 2011; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). This dissertation 
contributes to the extant literature by proposing a model which combines the firm capabilities 
and competitive dynamics researches. Chen's (1996) Awareness-Motivation-Capability model 
underscores the importance of the focal and rival firm's organizational capabilities in facilitating 
competitive actions. Although awareness and motivation usually induce a firm to plan 
competitive actions, it also needs to have corresponding capabilities to actually implement 
intended competitive actions. The current dissertation on a technological laggard's behavior with 
respect to its decision to move towards or to the technology frontier not only further builds on 
 7 
Chen's (1996) model in a technological context, but also highlights the importance of 
organizational capabilities in carrying out a firm’s competitive actions. Furthermore, the model 
in the current study incorporates a technological laggard's anticipated economic payoff from 
innovation as another factor to address the motivation issues raised in Chen's (1996) model. 
Examples from the flat panel display industry suggest that some firms may strategically choose 
to be technological laggards because being lagging allows them to achieve a higher profitability 
than from being the technological leader. Also, there still remains a theoretical tension in the 
competitive dynamics research regarding the degree to which firms should innovate in a 
competitive market (Aghion et al., 2005; Dutta, Lach & Rustichini, 1995; Graevenitz, 2005). 
The current study seeks to reconcile this particular issue by examining a technological laggard’s 
capabilities to protect its anticipated economic payoff in a competitive market, which 
subsequently determines to what extent a technological laggard chooses to innovate. Finally, the 
specific focus on technological laggards enables the current study to provide a relevant context in 
which it can supply managerial implications that are meaningful to many practitioners, because 
few managers are at the “winning” firms. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 
Figure 3. Theory overview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the available and most pertinent theories that can help to explain a 
technological laggard's strategic moves, and illustrates the theory construction in this dissertation.  
 
 
  
Firm Capabilities  
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 Path dependency  
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Competitive Dynamics 
 Economic payoff: economic gains vs. costs 
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 Competitive responses 
Dynamics of at the Technology Frontier  
 Firm capabilities 
 Environment characteristics  
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2.1 Firm Capabilities  
Firm capabilities research provides a disciplinary foundation for examining 
organizational capabilities, technology competition, and the dynamics at the technology frontier. 
Helfat and Peteraf define organizational capabilities as: "the ability of an organization to perform 
a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organization resources, for the purpose of achieving a 
particular end result" (2003: 999). For example, organizational capabilities can enable a 
technological laggard to better leverage both economies of scale and scope (Chandler, 1990). 
This dissertation focuses on an important complementary end result to Chandler’s work (1990) 
concerning whether a technological laggard moves towards, or to the technology frontier. One of 
the reasons as to why we have observed a variety of strategic moves is because technological 
laggards' resources and capabilities are generally more heterogeneous (Peteraf, 1993).  
Routines & path dependency  
In order to remain viable as an industry player, a technological laggard often continually 
develops new capabilities, which usually build upon their current capabilities (Mitchell & Shaver, 
2003). Indeed, a technological laggard typically develops its capabilities in a path-dependent 
process that is based upon an organization's own specific routines (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; 
Grant, 1996; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Because of the specificity of 
these routines, each technological laggard may follow a distinct path in developing its own 
capabilities (Itami & Roehl, 1987).  Taking into account a variety of elements that may influence 
its dynamic environment, a technological laggard might decide to focus on investments that 
afford it an opportunity to explore new capabilities that stretch beyond its existing portfolio, 
while another laggard may choose to focus on investments that exploit its current capabilities 
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(Ethiraj et al., 2005; Helfat, 1997; Jacobides, Knudsen & Augier, 2006; March, 1991; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2006).  
Capabilities reconfiguration and transformation 
A dynamic environment often creates challenges in which a technological laggard must 
develop new organizational capabilities in order to stay viable as a player in the competitive 
landscape. When a technological laggard attempts to utilize its current capabilities, following the 
existing path may nevertheless limit its options, since it may forgo the option of developing new 
capabilities that allow the laggard to better cope with its dynamic environment later down the 
road (Capron & Mitchell, 2004). The routines involved in utilizing existing capabilities can give 
rise to path dependency (Argyres, 1996) that sometimes lead to inertia, which is likely to 
effectively put a constrain on a technological laggard abilities to further developing its 
capabilities (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grindley & Teece, 1997). Part of this inertia is because 
when a technological laggard deviates from its current path it often runs a greater risk of failure 
(Tripsas, 2009). Thus, the often observed high level of difficulty that a technological laggard 
experiences when it attempts to develop new organizational capabilities to try and adapt to 
environmental changes underscores the importance of developing dynamic capabilities, which is 
"the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments" (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997: 516). A technological 
laggard with superior dynamic capabilities typically is more capable of breaking away from its 
current path of capabilities development, if necessary. These dynamic capabilities are especially 
important during high volatile environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Spanos & Prastacos, 
2004; Wang & Ahmed, 2007). 
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The use of dynamic capabilities renders strategic renewal a possibility that later leads to a 
new path of capabilities development for technological laggards (Teece, 2007; Wang & Ahmed, 
2007). In this process of strategic renewal, a technological laggard can integrate newly acquired 
knowledge from implementing strategic actions into future developments (Argyres & Liebeskind, 
1999; Argyres & Zenger, 2007; Danneels, 2002; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; Zollo & Winter, 
2002). Furthermore, a technological laggard with a better absorptive capacity can generally more 
effectively transform such knowledge into organizational capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Narasimhan, Rajiv & Dutta, 2006). While recognizing the importance of renewing organizational 
capabilities at a time of rapid change (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Winter, 2000), a 
technological laggard with renewed organizational capabilities still runs the risk of failure from 
technology competition (Peteraf, 1993), which we discuss to next.  
2.2 Competitive Dynamics 
A technological laggard has three strategic alternatives --- not moving from its current 
position, moving towards, and moving to the technology frontier (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997) in 
its attempt to survive (or even thrive) the often intense technology competition. The high interest 
in examining the economic gains and costs of alternative moves has sparked a stream of studies. 
For example, some have suggested a inclination to avoid direct competition with the 
technological leader as one of the reasons for a laggard’s moving towards the technology frontier 
(Hawley, 1950), and seeking a less crowded position where resources are more abundant can be 
another (Greve, 1998a, 1998b; Schmalensee, 1978). However, a technological laggard, by 
definition, cannot have first mover advantages simply by moving towards the technology frontier. 
The potential for better economic gains as a first mover can encourage a technological laggard to 
take greater risks by attempting to move to the technology frontier. But such an attempt 
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essentially requires a technological laggard to commercialize innovation that typically results in 
substantial cannibalization on products utilizing earlier innovations (Aboulnasr et al., 2008; 
Conner, 1986; Ghemawat, 1991; Greenstein, Wade & Greenstein, 1998; Levinthal & Purohit, 
1989; Norton & Bass, 1987; Reinganum, 1983). In sum, a technological laggard's decision to 
choose a specific strategic move is typically dependent on the anticipated economic payoff.  We 
discuss these economic gains and costs next. 
Economic payoff: economic gains vs. costs 
Deephouse (1999) underscores the importance for a technological laggard to maintain 
economic gains when participating in technology competition. Initially, technology competition 
of moderate intensity may increase a technological laggard's incentives to innovate (Aghion et 
al., 2005; Encaoua & Ulph, 2004). When technology competition is moderate, it is relatively 
easier for a technological laggard to innovate so as to surpass some of its rivals; while the 
technological leader continues innovating to maintain its technological leadership (Dasgupta & 
Stiglitz, 1980). Once technology competition becomes more intense, the technological leader and 
its rivals are likely to be locked in a technology race toward the commercialization of the latest 
innovation (Dutta, Lach & Rustichini, 1995; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1985). Intensified technology 
competition usually reduces a technological laggard's anticipated economic gains from 
innovation (Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2006), while the intensity of technology competition rarely 
decrease the costs of innovation (Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010). Therefore, intensified technology 
competition may be especially discouraging for technological laggards who attempt to move to 
the technology frontier, because of low anticipated gains and high innovation costs.  
There are a number of advantages being a technological laggard.  First, due to 
prohibitively high innovation costs (Huisman & Kort, 2002), a technological laggard may be 
financially better off not trying to move to the technology frontier if other strategic alternatives 
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that require lower R&D investments and/or yield a higher economic payoff become available. 
For instance, Eggers's (2009) empirical study of the flat panel display industry shows that 
technological laggards who are late in commercializing its innovation tend to have better 
economic performances.
5
 
Second, knowledge spillovers from the technological leader may enable a technological 
laggard to commercialize the same or similar innovation in a more cost-effective fashion 
(Eeckhout & Jovanovic, 2002; Kafouros & Buckley, 2008; McGahan & Silverman, 2006). 
Knowledge spillovers can reduce a technological laggard’s effort in developing the same or 
similar knowledge, thereby lowering its innovation costs and improving its economic payoff.  
Third, if a technological laggard remains behind the technology frontier, it can usually 
continue to appropriate its innovation value for a longer time period even when technological 
leadership changes hands. The longer it appropriates its innovation value, the more the economic 
gains it is able to accumulate. If a technological laggard decides to become the technological 
leader, rapid technology change often leads to a short-lived position of technological leadership, 
and it usually has less time to appropriate its innovation value as a result (Beath, Katsoulacos & 
Ulph, 1987; Eggers, 2009). As such, Grenadier and Weiss (1997) suggest that the adoption of the 
laggard strategy at the time of rapid technology change enables a technological laggard to have a 
better economic payoff.  
In sum, a technological laggard can have innovation costs advantage over the techno-
logical leader. Hence, the extant research suggests a possibility that a firm which seeks to 
maximize its economic value chooses to be a technological laggard, i.e., by having an explicit 
strategy of commercializing its innovation during a relatively later stage (Aghion, Harris & 
                                                 
5
 Unlike a technological laggard, the technological leader generally needs to innovate consistently and to be ready to 
commercialize the cutting-edge innovation and maintain its technological leadership (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; 
Hellwig & Irmen, 2001). 
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Vickers, 1997; Cho, Kim & Rhee, 1998; Filippini, 1999; Lilien & Yoon, 1990; Sudharshan, Liu 
& Ratchford, 2006). This discussion suggests that in order to determine a technological laggard’s 
value-maximizing strategy, we must fully analyze first and second mover advantages, which we 
cover next.  
First (and second) mover advantages 
Glazer (1985) asks whether the first mover in an economically attractive market 
possesses some advantages over later entrants. A technological laggard moving beyond the 
current technological frontier is more likely to receive higher economic returns, if there is no 
competitive response from other market participants. Further, even if there are other firms 
entering the market later, the technological laggard that has already moved beyond the 
technology frontier may still stand to receive higher economic returns and/or greater market 
share (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Carow, Heron & Saxton, 2004; Dos Santos & Peffers, 1995; 
Huff & Robinson, 1994; Jovanovic & Macdonald, 1994; Reinganum, 1983). Thus, first mover 
advantages often attract a technological laggard that seeks to become the technological leader
6
 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Makadok, 1998). This first-moving technological laggard 
who has moved beyond the technology frontier often attempts to influence the timing of product 
replacement, for example, to delay the commercialization of the next round of innovation 
(Conner, 1986; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1985; Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; 
Hendricks, 1992; Reinganum, 1983; Sudharshan et al., 2006). Furthermore, by the time rival firms 
begin to commercialize the newer innovation, the technological leader (i.e., the previous first-
mover technological laggard) is already in a position where it can quickly commercialize the 
same innovation by free-riding on its rivals' experience, and to continue driving the market 
                                                 
6
 The first mover here is not confined to the first firm commercializing the innovation. The 'first mover' here refers 
to early movers. By the same token, the 'second mover' does not specifically apply to the second firm after the first 
firm. The 'second mover' here refers to 'late movers'.  
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demand for the newer innovation (Jensen, 2003; Quirmbach, 1986). In sum, the economic gains 
associated with being a first-moving laggard can be high (Macieira, 2006; Mitchell, 1991), even 
when it requires high innovation costs. Ceteris paribus, high economic gain often associates with 
high costs, which motivate a technological laggard to maintain a lagging strategy to have second 
mover advantages. 
Second mover advantages provide at least two strategic reasons as to why a technological 
laggard chooses to remain behind the technology frontier. First, the patterns of competition 
among firms at the technology frontier, which then serve as a template for following rivals which 
attempt to deploy more advanced technologies (Cyert & March, 1963; Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Semadeni & Anderson, 2010). Second, knowledge spillovers 
from the technological leader can enable a technological laggard to quickly advance down the 
learning curve (Eeckhout & Jovanovic, 2002; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Zhang et al., 
2008). Thus, a technological laggard is often able to commercialize the same innovation at lower 
costs than the technological leader (Bayus, Jain & Rao, 1997; de Figueiredo & Kyle, 2006; 
Huisman & Kort, 2002; Leiblein & Ziedonis, 2007; Markides & Geroski, 2005). In sum, substantial 
second mover advantages can motivate a technological laggard to strategically lag behind the 
technology frontier.  
The extant research literature suggests that the intensity of technology competition and 
the temporal order of innovation commercialization both have influence over a technological 
laggard's strategic move. Such an analysis is more complete if the effect of the distance between 
the technological leader and laggard is also included.  
A technological laggard typically chooses a strategic move to avoid direct competition 
from the technological leader. The competition is likely to be more intense when the 
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technological leader and laggard are close in terms of their technological capabilities. Indeed, a 
technological laggard is likely to innovate more in order to be in a better position to move 
towards the technology frontier (Aghion et al., 2001, 2005; Alder, 2010; Boone, 2001; Macieira, 
2006), or to the technology frontier (Ali, 1994; Vickers, 1986). The strategic move by the 
initiating firm typically lead to competitive responses from rivals, and we examine these 
competitive responses next.  
Competitive Responses 
A rival (i.e., the technological leader or a technological laggard) that has become aware 
of a particular technological laggard’s initial move to the technology frontier typically reacts 
with its own competitive responses (Robertson, Eliashberg & Rymon, 1995). Chen's (1996) 
Awareness-Motivation-Capability framework explains when rivals are more likely to make 
competitive responses. As a baseline, a competitive response by some rivals
7
 often increases 
their economic gains, not only in the short-term but because it also helps to strengthen their 
reputation as a strong defender (Chen et al., 1992; Clark & Montgomery, 1998; Debruyne et al., 
2002). First, rivals are more likely to react to a technological laggard's visible (tangible) moves, 
because they are more likely to be aware of the threats it poses (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Chen 
et al., 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994a; 1994b). Second, rivals are more motivated to respond and try 
to defend their resources and/or market share when there is a high degree of resource 
interdependency between a technological laggard and its rivals due to resource sharing, or when 
they operate in a highly concentrated market (Arend, 1999; Bain, 1951; Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen, 1996; Derfus, Maggitti & Smith, 2008).  Third, the rivals are more likely to respond 
to the technological laggards initiating the move to the technology frontier because these rivals 
                                                 
7
 Rivals are the former technological leader and technological laggards previously deploy the most advanced 
technology. 
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are typically more capable of responding (Chen, Su & Tsai, 2007).  In sum, rivals are more 
likely to make competitive responses when they become aware of the initial moves by a 
challenger for technology leadership, and when they are motivated and capable of carrying on 
competitive responses (Chen, 1996).  
2.3 Dynamics at the Technology Frontier  
Firm capabilities  
On the one hand, a technological laggard is more likely to move to the technology 
frontier when it is closely behind the technological leader and therefore has less distance to the 
technology frontier compared with other laggards (Ali, 1994; Henderson, 1993; Huisman & Kort, 
2002; Lerner, 1997; Vickers, 1986). Thus, this technological laggard often chooses to invest 
heavily in R&D in an attempt to move to the technology frontier (Aoki, 1991; Gilbert & 
Newbery, 1982; Harris & Vickers, 1985; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Schilling, 2003; 
Vickers, 1986). On the other hand, a technological laggard may decide not to move to the 
technology frontier when it is already very close to the technology frontier, because the 
economic payoff may not be enough to justify the R&D costs involved in implementing the 
move (Aghion et al., 1997; Aoki, 1991; Encaoua & Ulph, 2004; Horner, 2003).  
In addition to moving to the technology frontier, another issue to be considered is which 
firms will innovate to improve their current technological position (even if the technological 
laggard does not move to the technology frontier). From this perspective, Abramovitz (1986) and 
Khanna (1995) suggest that a technological laggard who is still far behind the technology frontier 
may choose to innovate more in order to narrow its distance to the technology frontier.  
Moreover, strategic moves that bring a technological laggard closer to the technology 
frontier also causes the problem of product cannibalization (Adner & Kapoor, 2010) where the 
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newer innovation attracts demand away from the older technology (Raybaudi, Sola & 
Naindebam, 2010; Tirole, 1988). Norton and Bass (1987) utilize Pearl's law
8
 to illustrate that 
sales of newer innovation can predictably replace sales of the older technology over time 
(Grenadier & Weiss, 1997). Thus a technological laggard might even have a negative return on 
innovation due to product cannibalization (Leiblein & Ziedonis, 2007; Wörter, Rammer & 
Arvanitis, 2010). The greater the market share a technological laggard has, the greater the 
likelihood its sales are potentially cannibalized. Thus, a technological laggard with a large 
market share has lower economic incentives to innovate (Dutta et al., 1995; Ghemawat, 1991; 
Reinganum, 1989). Furthermore, the competitive dynamics literature suggests that a 
technological laggard with a large market share is less likely to respond to competitive actions 
(Debruyne et al., 2002) since maintaining its market share already consumes most of its 
resources. Therefore, these technological laggards are less capable of reacting to the rivalry in a 
timely manner (Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Chen et al., 1992). Subsequently, these 
technological laggards are more likely to experience greater market share erosion because they 
often fail to react quickly enough to competitive actions (Chen et al., 1992; Ferrier, Smith & 
Grimm, 1999; Grimm & Smith, 1997; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988). 
 In addition to considering the effect of revenue on the competitive dynamics, we also 
need to consider the costs associated with competitive responses. A technological laggard is less 
likely to receive competitive responses when rivals anticipate low the economic payoff from 
such a move (Aghion et al., 2001; Chen et al., 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Clark & Montgomery, 
1998). Competitive responses from rivals are expected to be less likely when technological 
                                                 
8
Pearl's law:    
 
   
    , where s is the sales of innovative product, t is time, and k is a constant.  
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change is rapid, in which case short-lived technological advances usually translate into lower 
economic gains (Kafouros & Buckley, 2008; Kafouros & Wang, 2008).  
A technological laggard's economic gains depend not only on rivals' competitive 
responses, but also on its organizational capabilities. The more time and experiences a 
technological laggard has had in the relevant technological environment, the more likely it is that 
a technological laggard has developed organizational capabilities that can enhance its 
performance in the environment (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Ferrier, 2001; Linden, Hart & Lenway, 
1997). The co-evolution of a technological laggard's organizational capabilities and its 
technological environment might limit its choice of strategic alternatives (Hutzschenreuter & 
Israel, 2009; Huergo & Moreno, 2010; Jovanovic & Nyarko, 1996; Leiblein & Madsen, 2009; 
Lamburg et al., 2009; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Zajac, Kraatz & Bresser, 2000). We 
consider the technological environment and some of its notable environmental characteristics 
next.  
Environmental characteristics 
A technological laggard's economic incentives to initiate competitive actions are likely to 
increase with the number of rivals sharing similar resources. Upon noticing competitive actions 
by other rivals, a technological laggard can either response in kind or does not take an action 
(Robertson et al., 1995). Because competitive actions are likely to lead to competitive responses, 
which can trigger a series of creative destruction (Dutta et al., 1995; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1991; 
Schumpeter, 1934), taking no action may be an overall better strategy for a technological laggard. 
Competitive responses are likely to lead to a more competitive environment in which a 
technological laggard more often than not has to settle for a lower economic payoff (Astley & 
Fombrun, 1983; Khandwalla, 1987; Stigler, 1964), which eventually discourages a technological 
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laggard from innovating (Kafouros & Buckley, 2008; McGahan & Silverman, 2006). Thus, a 
technological laggard can strategically react to rivalry by taking no actions.  
A technological laggard sharing similar resources with its rivals typically experiences 
stronger competitive tension (Alder, 2010; Chen et al., 2007; Porac et al., 1995), which result in 
more competitive actions or attacks of a greater magnitude (Chen et al., 2007; Shankar, 2006). 
Intense technology competition due to resource similarity is likely to reduce a technological 
laggard's economic payoff (Deephouse, 1999; Graevenitz, 2005) to such an extent that the 
technological laggard is likely to engage in a different strategy that helps it to avoid the 
competition (Aghion et al., 2005; Macieira, 2006). A technological laggard, motivated by the 
desire to avoid the technology competition, is likely to move to a new position where the 
intensity of technology competition is lower.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Table 1. Theory bases overview.  
Hypothesis    Focus    Level   Theories   Elements 
H1: Distance to the 
technology frontier  
 Organizational 
capabilities  
 Firm   Capabilities 
approach 
 
Routines, path dependency, 
and capability 
reconfiguration and 
transformation 
H2: Innovation momentum  Organizational 
capabilities 
 Firm   Capabilities 
approach  
Routines, path dependency   
H3: Experience at the 
technology frontier 
 Organization 
capabilities  
 Firm   Capabilities 
approach 
 Routines, path dependency 
H4: Prior window of  
competitive response 
 Economic 
incentives 
 Environment  Technology 
competition 
 Competitive response 
H5: Competition in the 
current position 
 Economic 
incentives  
 Environment   Technology 
competition  
 Economic payoff 
H6: Market share  Organization 
capabilities  
 Firm   Capabilities 
approach & 
Technology 
competition 
 Capabilities reconfiguration, 
economic payoff 
H7: Innovation momentum 
and market competition 
  Organizational 
capabilities & 
Economic 
incentives 
  Firm & 
environment 
  Capabilities 
approach & 
Technology 
competition  
  Routines, economic payoff 
  
Table 1 provides an overview of the theories for hypothesis development. Drawing on the 
firm capabilities research, Hypotheses 1-3 propose that a technological laggard is likely to 
choose a strategic move that better utilizes its existing organizational capabilities. Drawing on 
the competitive dynamics research, Hypotheses 4-6 propose that a technological laggard is likely 
to seek a position in which it can extract a higher economic payoff.  
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In this study, a technological laggard can: not move from its current position, move 
towards the current technology frontier, or move to the technology frontier. Under the current 
format, a technological laggard has a probability of choosing from the three strategic alternatives. 
The probability of choosing a given strategic alternative is independent of that of choosing the 
other alternatives. The sum of three probabilities is equal to one. Hence, for instance, a higher 
probability of a technological laggard moving to the technology frontier decreases the 
probabilities of it not moving and moving towards the technology frontier.  
The hypotheses incorporate relevant strategic alternatives when theoretical implications 
are available. Hence, of the three strategic alternatives available to technological laggards, some 
alternatives do not develop into a theoretical prediction for each hypothesis.  
  
 23 
3.1 The Simple Effect: Firm-level 
Distance to the technology frontier   
Figure 4. Illustration of a technological laggard's distance to the technology frontier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the scenario where technological laggards are at various distances to the 
technology frontier. A technological laggard's organizational capabilities are a critical factor in 
determining its position in relation to the technology frontier. A technological laggard who can 
move towards or to the technology frontier typically has better technological capabilities, and the 
process of capability development involves achieving a balance of economic gains and costs.  
First, for a technological laggard that is far behind the technology frontier, moving to the 
technology frontier usually requires it to improve its technological capabilities. Capability 
development can be costly (Ofek & Sarvary, 2003; Sudharshan et al., 2006). Costs to develop 
organizational capabilities that are needed to move to the technology frontier usually increase 
with a technological laggard's distance behind the technology frontier (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; 
Boulding & Christen, 2008; Grenadier & Weiss, 1994). Second, the more distance there is 
between a technological laggard and the technology frontier, the more difficult for the 
technological laggard to develop needed technological capabilities in a short timeframe due to 
Technology frontier 
: Technological laggard 
: Technological leader 
Technological laggard 
further behind the 
technology frontier 
 Not 
move 
Technological laggard 
behind and close to the 
technology frontier  
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time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010) or to 
develop routines required for innovating the new technology that can push the technology 
frontier outward (Runde et al., 2008; Teece, 1980). Third, although market uncertainty at the 
technology frontier is high for most firms
9
, it is even higher for a technological laggard. The 
further a technological laggard is behind the technology frontier, the less able it is to manage the 
market uncertainty because it has less or no experience at the technology frontier. Thus, market 
uncertainty at the technology frontier is even more likely to discourage a technological laggard 
from moving to the technology frontier (Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2003). Fourth, the 
competitive dynamics research suggests that moving to the frontier technology is a strategic 
action with high visibility (Aboulnasr et al., 2008; Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995); and the move is especially likely to draw attention from the technological 
leader as the move usually occurs not far from its position. Hence, moving to the technology 
frontier is generally perceived to be more intimidating to the technological leader, prompting it 
to respond competitively to counter the move by rival firms (Baum & Korn, 1999; Lant & Baum, 
1994; Porac et al., 1995). Furthermore, in addition to defending its market from the competition, 
a technological leader is also inclined to engage in competitive responses as a way to maintain its 
leadership status (Zahra, Nash & Bickford, 1995). Competitive responses from the technological 
leader are likely to reduce the economic payoff that a technological laggard anticipates to gain 
from moving to the technology frontier (Smith et al., 1997).  
Taken together, the costs associated with moving to the technology frontier usually 
increase with a technological laggard's distance behind the technology frontier, hence lowering 
                                                 
9
 For instance, Eli Lilly introduces a supreme breakthrough insulin product in 1980 that receives poor market 
acceptance.  Not only customers do not like it but retailers are also reluctant to add it to their already crowded shelf. 
Source: Eli Lilly and Company: Innovation in Diabetes Care, Harvard Business case 9-696-077 by C. M. 
Christensen, 2004 
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the anticipated economic payoff; economic payoff is likely to decrease due to competitive 
response. Therefore, the increases in a technological laggard's distance behind the technology 
frontier decrease its likelihood of moving to the technology frontier.  
Hypothesis 1move to: The further a technological laggard is behind the technology frontier, 
the less likely it will move to the technology frontier. 
If a technological laggard's likelihood of moving to the technology frontier decreases, its 
likelihood of choosing the other two strategic alternatives increases. I develop two sub-
hypotheses that can help explain why the likelihood of a technological laggard not moving from 
its current position, and moving towards the technology frontier each increase with its distance 
behind the technology frontier.  
By how much a technological laggard can move towards the technology frontier largely 
depends on its technological capabilities. First, moving towards, but not all the way to, requires a 
lower level of technological capabilities from a technological laggard than moving to the 
technology frontier, because technologies behind the technology frontier are generally less 
advanced (Jovanovic, 2009). Also, a technological laggard typically incurs lower costs when 
moving towards than to the technology frontier (de Figueiredo & Kyle, 2006; Markides & 
Geroski, 2005; Leiblein & Ziedonis, 2007), because costs involved in developing the same 
technology decreases with the number of prior deployments (Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 
2007; Ruiz-Aliseda & Zemsky, 2006). Additionally, more knowledge is generally available for 
less advanced technologies thanks to knowledge spillovers
10
 from firms that have deployed the 
technology before (Eeckhout & Jovanovic, 2002; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; McGahan & 
                                                 
10
 Knowledge spillovers can be an intentional strategic action by the technological leader, such as technology 
transfer in the form of licensing, joint venture, or alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Asakawa, 2007; Hamel, 1991; 
Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002). In that case, the technological leader decides when and what to transfer. Knowledge 
spillovers can be unintentional as well. The second mover advantage literature explains how late mover firms can 
learn from the experience of early mover firms (Dutta et al., 1995; Hoppe, 2000).  
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Silverman, 2006). Second, moving towards the technology frontier is generally less visible and 
not be perceived as intimidating to other rival firms than moving to the technology frontier, 
hence inviting fewer competitive responses from other technological laggards. A move towards 
the technology frontier is even less likely to receive competitive responses from the 
technological leader because such a move poses little threat to its leadership status. Third, a 
technological laggard who moves towards the technology frontier is likely to compete with a 
different type of rivals when moving to the technology frontier. The study into the ever-changing 
basis of competition suggests that a technological laggard selects a competition base where there 
are few direct rivals (Carroll, 1985). A technological laggard is likely to be more competitive if 
the selected base enables it to better utilize its resources (Baum, 1995; Baum & Korn, 1999). 
Because a technological laggard's resources and organizational capabilities are generally less 
specialized than the technological leader's, moving towards the technology frontier is therefore 
more likely to provide a better competition base that allows a technological laggard to show 
higher strength of competition than moving to the technology frontier (Baum, 1995; Brittain & 
Freeman, 1980). In sum, the greater the distance a technological laggard is behind the technology 
frontier, the more likely it chooses to move towards than move to the technology frontier due to 
the limitations of its organizational capabilities.  
Hypothesis 1move towards: The further a technological laggard is behind the technology 
frontier, the more likely it will move towards the technology frontier as opposed to 
moving to the technology frontier. 
A technological laggard that is far behind the technology frontier generally has inferior 
technological capabilities. The inferiority of its technological capabilities usually deters it from 
moving to a new position, mostly because the process of capability development can be very 
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costly. Unlike a technological laggard who chooses to moves towards the technology frontier and 
as a result is generally required to innovate to keep up with the progression of the technology 
frontier (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Hellwig & Irmen, 2001), a technological laggard can do little 
innovation to remain in its current position with little innovation (Alder, 2010; Beath, 
Katsoulacos & Ulph, 1987; Eggers, 2009). Moreover, capabilities of a technological laggard who 
is far behind the technology frontier are likely to further deteriorate because the technological 
laggard is not able to benefit from the knowledge spillovers occurring at/near the technology 
frontier (Jovanovic & Nyarko, 1996; Kafouros & Buckley, 2008; Khanna, 1995). A 
technological laggard's absorptive capacity is likely to dwindle as well because its limited access 
to the technology frontier (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), viz. locked-out by its old technologies. 
Dwindling absorptive capacity typically increases a technological laggard's difficulty in 
improving its technological capabilities (Narasimhan et al., 2006). For a technological laggard 
who is far behind the technology frontier, it is likely to be even more difficult for it to move 
towards or to the technology frontier (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Fudenberg et al., 1983; 
Mansfield, 1985).  Even not moving to a new position, older technologies can still sell for an 
extended period (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Therefore, a technological laggard's distance to the 
technology frontier increases with its likelihood of not moving from its current position.  
Hypothesis 1not move: The further a technological laggard is behind the technology frontier, 
the more likely it will not move from its current position as opposed to moving to the 
technology frontier. 
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Innovation momentum 
The firm capabilities research suggests that a technological laggard's experience usually 
becomes one of the contributing factors that leads to the development of its organizational 
capabilities (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998b; King & Tucci, 2002). Hence, a technological 
laggard with experience of moving towards the technology frontier is likely to be more capable 
of repeating the move (Chen, Lin & Michel, 2010). Furthermore, a technological laggard that is 
capable of utilizing such organizational capabilities on a regular basis tends to exhibit higher 
innovation momentum that leads it to be more capable of, and hence is even more likely to move 
to a new position (Hutzschenreuter & Israel, 2009; Joshi, 2005; Kelly &Amburgey, 1991).   
Given the importance of capability in competition, a technological laggard is more likely 
to respond with organizational capabilities that it utilizes on a regular basis (Cohen, March & 
Olsen, 1972; Pablo, 1994). Also, practices usually develop into routines. A technological laggard 
with experience of moving towards the technology frontier is likely to develop routines that can 
help it to achieve higher innovation momentum. Thus, the increase in a technological laggard's 
innovation momentum increases its likelihood of moving towards the technology frontier.  
Hypothesis 2move towards or to: The greater a technological laggard's innovation momentum 
is, the more likely it will move towards or to the technology frontier as opposed to not 
moving from its current position. 
Hypothesis 2 posits that a technological laggard's experience is likely to be one of 
contributing factors that develops its organizational capabilities. Experience gained at the 
technology frontier is especially likely to develop capabilities that can make a technological 
laggard more competitive at the technology frontier.   
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Experience at the technology frontier 
A technological laggard is likely to develop organizational capabilities in response to its 
experience gained in a certain environment (Adner &Kapoor, 2010; Ferrier, 2001; Robinson, 
Fornell & Sullivan, 1992). In considering whether to move to the technology frontier, a 
technological laggard is likely to choose a strategic move that can help increase the utility of its 
existing organizational capabilities (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; Greves, 1998a; 1998b). First, a 
technological laggard with experience at the technology frontier is likely to develop 
organizational capabilities that can enable it to compete with technological leaders at the 
technology frontier (Eggers, 2012; Fanelli 2006; King & Tucci, 2002). For instance, a 
technological laggard with experience at the technology frontier typically knows the terms of 
competition because it has acquired that knowledge at the technology frontier from previous 
encounters with other rival firms (Koka & Prescott, 2008; Lant & Baum, 1994; Porac et al., 
1995).  
Second, a technological laggard's experience at technology frontier suggests that it had 
been a technological leader. The longer a technological laggard has held the position of 
technological leadership in the past, the more likely it sets regaining that position as its aspiration 
target (Baum & Korn, 1999; March, 1988; Lant, 1992). For a technological laggard who had 
been a technological leader before, its motivation to regain the leadership position is stronger, 
and it is likely to be more aggressive than other technological laggards who have never been a 
technological leader (Bowman, 1982; Baum et al., 2005; March & Shapira, 1992). Hence, a 
technological laggard who has accumulated the more experience at the technology frontier is 
more likely to take even more risk in trying to move to the technology frontier.  
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Hypothesis 3move to: The more experience a technological laggard has at the technology 
frontier, the more likely it will move to the technology frontier. 
After analyzing firm-level characteristics that affect a technological laggard’s likelihood 
of choosing one specific strategic alternative over the others, this study changes now broaden its 
scope of analysis to the environment-level. Hypothesis 4 and 5 each underscore the 
environmental influence on a technological laggard’s likelihood of not moving from its current 
position, or moving to the technology frontier. This research highlights how a technological 
laggard’s environment affects the anticipated economic payoff from innovation, which 
subsequently determines its strategic move.  
Prior window of competitive response 
Figure 5. Illustration of prior window of competitive response (Time the first technological 
laggard took to move to the technology frontier). 
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Figure 5 illustrates that a technological laggard first use the length of prior windows of 
competitive responses as a gauge before deciding whether to move to the technology frontier. A 
short window of competitive response from the prior most advanced technologies suggests that 
firms in the industry may have a higher tendency of moving to the technology frontier (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1998). First, the competitive dynamics research suggests that moving to the 
technology frontier is a visible action that usually invites competitive responses (Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Chen & Miller, 1994; Miller & Chen, 1994a; 1994b)
11
. A technological laggard 
and its rival firms are likely to have developed a process of "action-reaction" in which 
technological leadership changes hands constantly (Ali, 1994; Vickers, 1986). Second, the firm 
capabilities research suggests that there are firms capable of maintaining competitive parity 
(Jensen, 2003; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Technological leaders are more likely to initiate 
competitive responses because of their superior technological capabilities and the motivation to 
defend their reputation as a credible defender (Ailwadi, Lehmann & Neslin, 2001; Chen et al., 
1992).  
Hence, a technological laggard is likely to anticipate better economic payoff if 
competitive responses occur more slowly (Hoppe, 2000; Katz & Shapiro, 1987; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). Therefore, the time it takes for competitive response to occur increases a 
technological laggard's likelihood of moving to the technology frontier.   
Hypothesis 4move to: The longer it has taken for any firm to respond to the advancing of 
the technology frontier in the past, the more likely a technological laggard moves to the 
technology frontier. 
                                                 
11
 It is important to highlight the difference between game theory and the competitive dynamics research in terms of 
their use in this study. Game theory generally assumes that players have a perfect foresight and there are defined 
rules of game for players; while the competitive dynamics research does not maintain such an assumption.  
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In addition to prior window of competitive response, the competition in a technological 
laggard's current position is also likely to encourage it to move to a new position (Capron & 
Chatain, 2008).  
Market competition in the current market 
Figure 6. Illustration of competition in positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that intensity of market competition increases when there are more 
firms (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Kilduff et al., 2010). Escalating market competition in the 
current market usually reduces a technological laggard's anticipated economic payoff from 
innovation if it remains in the current market (Fuentelsaz, Gomez & Polo, 2002)
12
. On the 
revenue side, a technological laggard is more likely to draw more aggressive competitive actions 
from its rivals as market competition intensifies (Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; 
Chen et al., 2010). A technological laggard’s technology value is likely to be lower than 
                                                 
12
 There are several explanations as to why market competition can reduce a technological laggard's likelihood of 
moving to a new position. First, Vives' (2005) game-theoretic models suggest that market competition is likely to 
deter technology advancement mostly because firms have become more risk-averse. Hence, when the degree of 
market competition is high, not moving from the current position can be a technological laggard's decision in 
response to competition. Second, Chen (1996) discusses how rival firms' capabilities of initiating competitive 
responses affect the focal firm's competitive behavior. The focal firm may choose not to act if it lacks required 
capabilities, or if its rival firms possess superior capabilities. Because extant research literature (Barney, 1991; 
Roberts, 1999) suggests economic payoff as the main factor affecting a firm's competitive behavior, I decide to 
adopt the view of economic payoff to develop this hypothesis.  
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originally anticipated due to increasing market competition (Aghion, Harris & Vickers, 1997; 
Cotterill & Haller, 1992). Consequently, a technological laggard in a competitive market is likely 
to have lower revenue (Astley & Fombrun, 1983; Khandwalla, 1987; Stigler, 1964). On the cost 
side, intense market competition often increases the costs of a technological laggard, as a result 
of increasing difficulty in protecting its market resources from competition (Adner & Zemsky, 
2005; Kilduff, Elfenbein & Staw 2010; Sirmon et al., 2010), and acquiring new resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Yasai-Ardekani, 1989).  
Taken together, a technological laggard in an increasingly competitive market is likely to 
experience lower revenue and higher costs , resulting in a lower economic payoff (Gardner, 2005; 
Obloj & Capron, 2011; Young, Smith & Grimm, 1996). Decrease in a technological laggard's 
anticipated economic payoff increases its likelihood of moving to a new position (Khandwalla, 
1973)
13
. 
Hypothesis 5move towards or to: The greater the market competition in a technological 
laggard’s current market is, the more likely it will move towards or to the technology 
frontier as opposed to not moving from its current position. 
Market share 
Hypothesis 6 emphasizes the influence of market share on a technological laggard's 
anticipated economic incentives, which then increase the likelihood of it not moving from the 
current position. A large market share typically increases a technological laggard's inertia, and 
places a constraint on its organizational resources
14
 (Dutta et al., 1995; Golder & Tellis, 1993; 
                                                 
13
 The current logic is comparable with the diversification literature's predictions and findings regarding lagging 
firms' innovation behavior. In order to avoid technology competition, a lagging firm can better appropriate the value 
of its technology by applying its existing knowledge and resources to other products (Miller, 2004). 
14
 Although the extant research literature suggests that a market share may endow a firm with more resources, a big 
market share does not always lead to resources abundance. For instance, a firm often gains more market share at the 
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Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1991; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Hence, this 
dissertation posits that a large market share discourages a technological laggard from moving to 
the technology frontier.  
A large market share usually reduces the economic payoff that a technological laggard 
anticipates moving to the technology frontier, mainly because of the following five reasons. First, 
a large market share typically requires more organizational resources from a technological 
laggard. Given that organizational resources are usually constant in the short run, moving to the 
technology frontier is likely to force a technological laggard to rearrange its resources, impairing 
its ability to manage its current market share. Even if sometimes a market share endows a firm 
with abundant resources, not all resources are for investments in innovating and not all 
innovations are for developing the most advanced technology. A technological laggard may have 
adequate resources when it moves to the technology frontier, but lack organizational capabilities 
to implement the move. Second, a large market share typically generates sizeable revenue which 
is likely to discourage a technological laggard from leaving its current position (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1998). Third, a technological laggard with a large market share usually reacts more 
slowly to competitive actions from rivals than one with a small market share due to inertia (Chen 
& Hambrick, 1995; Chen et al., 1992). High inertia resulting from a large market share generally 
weakens a technological laggard's ability to manage competitive actions from rivals. High inertia 
usually leads a technological laggard to experience a more substantial erosion of its market share 
(Ferrier et al., 1999). In effect, inertia sometimes can be a technological laggard’s response to 
profit-maximization, even when such an action may lead to an organization’s decline (Lieberman 
                                                                                                                                                             
expense of profitability (Armstrong & Collopy, 1996). When a firm sets maximizing market share as its top priority, 
it may gain more sales by cutting price (Venkatraman, 1989), or spending more on marketing and manufacturing 
(MacMillan and Day 1987), which can be detrimental to its profitability (and hence available resources). Further, a 
firm may not be able to maintain product quality during price war, resulting lower customer satisfaction, which can 
also damage its profitability (Anderson, Fornell & Lehmann, 1994; Fornell, 1992). 
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& Montgomery, 1988). Fourth, the preference for a less volatile environment can also discourage 
a technological laggard from trying to change the market's status quo (Ali 1994; Ferrier, 2001; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Reinganum, 1989), thereby precluding competitive actions from the rivalry. 
Fifth, a technological laggard with a large market share may too focus on fully utilizing its 
existing organizational capabilities to develop new routines (Leonard-Barton 1992; Sirmon et al., 
2007; Sirmon et al., 2010); consequently, the technological laggard is unable to leverage the 
existing organizational capabilities to manage market uncertainty that may result from moving to 
the technology frontier (Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1989). To move to the 
technology frontier, a technological laggard is required to have organizational capabilities that 
can facilitate its innovation (Chandy & Tellis, 2000)
15
. Without the required capabilities, a 
technological laggard is less likely to move to the technology frontier. Collectively, the greater 
the market share a technological laggard has, the less inclined it is towards innovating 
(Czarnitzki & Kraft 2004). A low level of organizational resources and capabilities that are 
needed to manage technology and market competition further deters a technological laggard 
from moving to the technology frontier
16
. 
Hypothesis 6move to: The greater a technological laggard’s market share, the less likely it 
will move to the technology frontier. 
  
                                                 
15
 Chandy and Tellis (2000) maintain that a firm is less vulnerable to technological inertia if it develops market and 
technological capabilities that are apt to facilitate radical innovation. However, compared with the technological 
leader, a technological laggard is less likely to develop the required capabilities due to lower exposure to the 
technology frontier, and it may be less than willing to develop the required capabilities, simply because those 
required resources are not really necessary for its current operation.   
16
 The scope of theoretical implications of market share may go beyond organizational capabilities. In fact, 
Bronnenberg, Dhar and Dube (2009) suggest that entry order and organizational capabilities both affect a firm's 
market share. The authors call for the distinction between "early-entry effect" and "marketing competence." This 
dissertation follows the economic aspect of market share that the anticipated economic payoff is a critical factor in 
influencing a firm's technology deployment decision (Gilbert, 2006).  
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3.2 Complete model: The firm- & environment- effect 
Innovation momentum and market competition 
Competitive dynamic research suggests that market competition in the current market 
makes it more difficult for a technological laggard to maintain its market position (Grossman & 
Mendoza, 2003; Priem, 2007; Rao & Drazin, 2002). The firm capabilities research suggests that 
a technological laggard with innovation momentum is more likely to move to a new position. 
Taken together, the innovation momentum is likely to positively moderate the relationship 
between market competition and a technological laggard's likelihood of moving to a new 
position. The market competition is more likely to trigger a technological laggard to move to a 
new position if it has greater innovation momentum. 
Hypothesis 7move to or towards: As a technological laggard’s innovation momentum increases, 
the positive effect of market competition on its likelihood of either moving towards or to 
the technology frontier becomes stronger.  
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Table 2. Hypothesis summary.  
 Element 
Level of 
analysis 
Theory basis Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
1move to 
Distance Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities 
The further a technological laggard is behind the 
technology frontier, the less likely it will move to the 
technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
1move towards 
Distance Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities 
The further a technological laggard is behind the 
technology frontier, the more likely it will move 
towards the technology frontier as opposed to moving 
to the technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
1not move  
Distance Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities 
The further a technological laggard is behind the 
technology frontier, the more likely it will not move 
from its current position as opposed to moving to the 
technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
2move towards 
or to 
Innovation 
momentum 
Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities 
The greater a technological laggard's innovation 
momentum is, the more likely it will move towards or 
to the technology frontier as opposed to not moving 
from its current position 
Hypothesis 
3move to 
Experience 
at the 
technology 
frontier 
Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities 
The more experience a technological laggard has at 
the technology frontier, the more likely it will move to 
the technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
4move to 
Prior 
window of 
competitive 
response 
Environment Competition 
The longer it has taken for any firm to respond to the 
advancing of the technology frontier in the past, the 
more likely a technological laggard moves to the 
technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
5move towards 
or to 
Market 
competition 
in the 
current 
market 
Environment Competition 
The greater the market competition in a technological 
laggard’s current market is, the more likely it will 
move towards or to the technology frontier as opposed 
to not moving from its current position 
Hypothesis 
6move to 
Market 
share 
Firm 
Organizational 
capabilities & 
competition  
The greater a technological laggard’s market share, the 
less likely it will move to the technology frontier 
Hypothesis 
7move to or 
towards 
Innovation 
momentum 
& market 
competition 
Firm & 
environment 
Organizational 
capabilities & 
competition 
As a technological laggard’s innovation momentum 
increases, the positive effect of market competition on 
its likelihood of either moving towards or to the 
technology frontier becomes stronger 
Table 2 summarizes all hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
4.1 Why the Flat Panel Display Industry 
This dissertation uses the flat panel display industry as an empirical setting. Some 
research studies have adopted the flat panel display industry mainly for the purpose of studying 
innovation (Eggers, 2009; Linden et al., 1997; Mathews, 2003; 2004; 2005; Spencer, 2003). The 
flat panel display industry provides several empirical advantages to testing hypotheses in this 
dissertation. First, the flat panel display industry is one of the fastest growing industries. The fast 
pace in innovation enables researchers to collect a larger amount of data in a relative short period 
of time. Every plant that produces flat display panels has a generation. The industry's first 
generation plant was built in 1990. The size of mother glass substrate at the time was 30cm x 
40cm (≈11.8” x 15.7”), which is equivalent to the size of an open fashion magazine17. Today, an 
8.5th generation plant, which has become the main production force, produces the size of mother 
glass substrate at approximately 220cm x 250cm (≈86.6” x 98.4”), equivalent to the size of a 
pool table. The flat panel makers have economic incentives to process increasingly large-sized 
mother glass substrates due to strong demand for large-sized display that cathode ray tube (CRT) 
and other older generations of display technologies cannot offer. Within a relatively short period 
of time, the advancement of technological specifications from generation to generation has 
provided us with ample opportunities to observe the strategic moves made by technological 
leader and laggards (Christensen, 1997; Cho et al., 1998). 
Second, the dimension of a firm’s technological capabilities is relatively clear. A firm's 
technological capabilities of producing flat panel displays are its most advanced generation of 
                                                 
17
 AUO Online: Technology (http://www.auo.com/?sn=188&lang=en-US)  
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plants. A higher generation plant can process a larger mother glass substrate; the later section 
'size matters!' I explain why the ability to manufacture a large mother glass substrate is both 
technologically and economically critical in the flat panel display industry. The ability to 
produce large size panels is a common index for a flat panel maker's technological capabilities. 
Thus, the most advanced generation of plants offers an empirical approach to approximate the 
flat panel maker's technological capabilities, and to define the technology frontier.  
Third, a higher generation plant can process a glass substrate of a larger size, which is 
divided into display panels later in the process. A large glass substrate can either produce a 
display panel of a larger size, which commends a higher price margin, or yields more display 
panels, achieving economies of scale. Hence, moving to the technology frontier occurs 
frequently in this industry (Linden et al., 1997). Since the inception of the flat panel display 
industry, technological laggards have each taken turns developing the most advanced technology 
for each generation. The first laboratory prototype was produced in the United States
18
 in 1972. 
Matsushita Electric and Toshiba were both among the first firms to begin mass production and 
putting their American counterparts behind the technology frontier in 1991 (Mathews, 2005). 
The competition further intensified after Samsung and LG joined the industry in 1994. The 
technological leader and laggards have surpassed each other more frequently since early 2000.  
Fourth, the process of manufacturing flat panel displays requires constant innovations. 
With the rapid pace of technology advancement, there are a good number of firms stationed at 
different distances to the technology frontier, providing variances with respect to firms' strategic 
moves. 
  
                                                 
18
 Brody, T.P., 1997, Birth of the Active Matrix, Information Display, Vol. 13, No. 10, p. 28-32. 
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A brief history of the flat panel display industry
19
 
Figure 7. The evolution of the flat panel display industry. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the growth of the flat panel display industry over the years. 
Technological innovation dominants almost exclusively in the earlier periods, and market 
development has become more important as the industry evolves. I provide details of technology 
and market development in each decade since the birth of display technology.  
The 1960s is a decade in which substantial technology advancement occurred in the flat 
panel display industry. The inventions of today's dominant technologies all take place in this 
decade. In 1960, RCA Sarnoff Research Center discovers the substance of liquid crystal which 
scatters light when it is in a transparent state. This discovery is among one of the first key 
findings that eventually leads to corporate interests in the flat panel display industry. In 1964, 
RCA creates an image-capable display. In the same year, the University of Illinois' Computer-
based Education Research Lab develops an alternating current plasma display panel. In 1967, 
                                                 
19
 Murtha, Lenway & Hart (2001) is the main citation source for this section.   
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Westinghouse creates thin-film transistors (TFT), the dominant technology widely used in 
today's flat panel display. In 1968, RCA introduces its liquid crystal display at a press conference 
in New York City. In the same year, Westinghouse develops an active matrix electroluminescent 
display. In 1969, the researchers from Kent State University invent a twisted-nematic liquid 
crystal display (TN LCD). 
The 1970s features a decade of entries by Japanese firms and exits by American firms. In 
1970, RCA first begins licensing its liquid crystal technology to Sharp. In 1971, Westinghouse 
researchers develop an active matrix liquid crystal display for U.S. Air Force. In 1973, Sharp 
introduces the first handheld calculator using the LCD technology; Seiko Epson introduces the 
first digital watch using the LCD technology; IBM utilizes results from their joint program with 
the University of Illinois and starts to manufacture small monochrome plasma display panels 
(PDPs); two years later, IBM constructs a plant that builds larger PDPs in Kingston, New York. 
RCA and Westinghouse end their flat panel display program in 1974 and in 1978, respectively.  
The 1980s is a decade full of excitement. A greater extent of commercialization and mass 
production rolls out in this decade, and supporting industries has played a significant role. Seiko 
has a TFT LCD television in its lab in 1982, introduces a prototype in 1983, and starts marketing 
a 2-inch TFT LCD television in 1984. In 1986, Matsushita introduces a 3-inch TFT LCD 
television; Sharp begins mass-production of STN LCD for laptop screens. Also in 1986, IBM 
ends its plasma production and enters a joint R&D with Toshiba to develop TFT LCD. Starting 
in 1987, Sharp mass produces small panels for 3 to 4-inch TFT LCD television. In 1989, Corning, 
who supplies mother glass substrate to flat panel display makers, and Applied Materials, who is a 
supplier of equipment for panel manufacturing, begins to develop specialized products for buyers 
from the flat panel display industry.  
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The 1990s is a tough decade for Japanese and American makers because of financial 
crisis and rival entry. In 1990, NEC builds the first generation 1 (Gen1) TFT LCD production 
line. In 1991, Sharp follows the suit and constructs its 1
st
 generation plant for mass-production of 
large-format color TFT LCD. In 1992, the industry experiences shortages after IBM introduces 
the first laptop
20
 with a color TFT LCD. In 1994, Sharp begins its 2
nd
 generation TFT LCD 
production line. In 1995, Samsung and LG each enter the industry with 2
nd
 generation plants. In 
1997, the financial crisis upsets Japanese and Korean makers. The capital shortage leads 
Japanese makers to license technologies to Taiwanese makers, officially making the entry by 
Taiwanese makers in the industry in late 1990s. LG receives capital from and forms a joint 
venture with Philips. Also in 1997, Samsung's 3
rd
 generation plant achieves commercial yields. 
In 1999, LG.Phillips begins operations. In the same year, Samsung and LG.Philips surpass 
Japanese makers to become industry leaders.   
The 2000s is a decade of growth and increasing rivalry. The market value of flat panel 
display industry grows from $24 billion in 2000 to $95 billion in 2008. The TFT LCD has 
become 'the' technology for flat panel display, while OLED is steadily increasing its market 
share every year
21
. The applications for flat panel display have grown considerably.  On top of 
laptop and digital watch, in-vehicle display, mobile phone screen, handheld devices, large 
televisions, and other products have also fueled the stronger demand for flat panel displays. In 
addition to Japanese and Korean makers, Taiwanese and Chinese makers enter the industry in 
tandem. In a couple of years, Taiwanese makers in total have accounted for more than 40% of 
the total global large size (≥10-inch) TFT LCD shipment; while Japanese makers claim 12%. 
Samsung and LG.Philips have been able to achieve a stronger leadership position by aggressive 
                                                 
20
 This model is IBM ThinkPad Model 700C 
21
 Hsieh, D., Globalization of Display Industry, DisplaySearch Asia Round Table Forum, 2005 
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investment made over years, while the Japanese and Taiwanese makers have been lacking in this 
regard.   
The evolution of display technology 
This section provides a briefly review on the current and future commercialized display 
technologies. The CRT was the major technology before the rise of flat panel display in 1990s. 
Liquid crystal display (LCD) has been the dominant flat panel display technology due to in large 
part to the promotion by Japanese flat panel display makers in 1980s. 
Figure 8. The technologies for producing flat panel display. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the dominant commercialized technologies for flat panel display. The five 
major commercialized technologies are, in the order of development, super twisted-nematic 
(STN), twisted-nematic (TN) , thin film transistors (TFT), plasma display panel (PDP), and 
organic light-emitting diode (OLED). STN technology adds colors to a panel by adding internal 
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filters. Display adopting STN technology usually has very long response times and poor contrast 
ratio, which are very typical of passive matrix technologies. STN are often the technology used 
in manufacturing older laptop screens and weight scale displays. Display for more recent laptop 
screens and televisions utilize active matrix technologies. TFT is probably the most widely 
adopted active matrix technologies. Displays using TFT have brighter and sharper image quality 
and shorter response times. Besides TFT, TN is another common active matrix technology, 
where the control of voltage twists liquid crystal elements at varying degrees to block or pass the 
light. Because it is made with a different mechanism from LCD, PDP has been the dominant 
technology in producing large flat display panels. OLED is likely to be the next dominant display 
technology after LCD. The OLED technology initially supplies the market of with small size 
displays, and gradually increases its panel size to enter the market of median size display. 
Working principal of flat panel display: Size matters! 
A brief introduction to the mechanism
22
 of flat panel display is helpful to understand why 
flat panel display makers' race to build higher generation plants. Each flat panel display is 
divided from a piece of glass substrate. A large size of glass substrate means more panels per 
glass substrate and better economies of scale, which is why moving to higher generation plant is 
so important to flat panel display makers
23
.   
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 The key technological information sources in this section are AU Optronics (www.auo.com), LD Display 
(www.lgdisplay.com), and Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma). 
23
 A glimpse into the flat panel market by Ed Hall (SEMI) and Charles Annis (DisplaySearch) 
(http://www.semi.org/en/About/SEMIGlobalUpdate/Articles/P037787) 
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TFT LCD 
 
 
 
 
 
Three key components of TFT LCD are back light module, TFT array, and color filter. 
Back light module is the source of light (Ukai, 2007; Lin, Chen & Huang, 2004). Thin film 
transistor is printed on TFT array substrate. The application of voltage changes the direction of 
liquid crystal, which controls the path that light passes through. The color filter controls which 
colors to be shown. The loss of light from emitting out of backlight module to color filter 
substrate is around 85%. The thickness of a TFT LCD panel is about 3 to 4 nm.  
 The technology used in printing thin film transistor explains the limited size of display 
(Kelly, 2000). First, in order to have a glass substrate ready for printing, the evenness of glass 
substrate is critical. The larger the glass substrate, the more uneven the surface becomes. Second, 
before the printing takes place, the glass substrate needs to go through several rounds of 
chemical vaporization and etching. A large piece of the glass substrate typically has lower yield.  
PDP 
 
 
 
 
In terms of manufacturing large size display, PDP has a significant advantage because it 
uses an entirely different mechanism to control light path (Kelly, 2000). The plasma display 
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panel is made of two panels of glass, and there are thousands of compartments in between those 
two panels. These compartments hold noble gases and mercury. The noble gases form into 
plasma when voltage is applied to these compartments. The changes in energy level of different 
phosphor painted in the compartments results in plasma, giving off visible different lights.  
 Because PDP does not require printing circuits on a substrate like TFT, PDP is far more 
suitable for displays of a much larger size. The largest PDP has a size of 103 inches. The 
technological drawbacks for PDP include hefty weight, energy inefficiencies, and fading colors 
once noble gases begin to dissipate. 
OLED 
 
 
 
 
 
Originally conceived as a different invention than TFT, OLED can function without 
backlight module (Kelly, 2000). Layers of organization materials consist of OLED (Nieto, 2005). 
Upon the application of voltage, a current of electrons from anode and cathode from two outer 
layers flows to the center, forming an exited state in the emission layer. The emission of 
radiation with a frequency that is in the visible region occurs when the exited state decays. The 
layer of OLED requires organic vaporization and the use of excimer laser, which place a 
constraint on the size the panel can grow.  
Among the next generation of technologies, OLED seems to be the most promising one 
for the following reasons (Crawford, 2005). First, it is very thin, less than 1 nm thick. Compared 
with TFT, it is brighter, has a sharper contrast, faster response speed, and wider viewing angle. 
Anode 
Cathode 
G B R Emission layer 
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Its low-power consumption feature is a highly desirable one because the handheld devices using 
the OLED technology can last much longer than others. The most acclaimed feature of OLED is 
its flexibility. An OLED display can be bended like a piece of paper. This flexibility allows for a 
broader range of applications of OLED technology, such as e-paper.  
Technical and financial difficulties in growing panel size
24
 
25
 
There are at least five major technical difficulties in manufacturing large glass 
substrates
26
. First, it is difficult to lock in the yields at the same level across the board, especially 
for glass substrate of smaller sizes at the early stage of production. Second, glass substrates move 
in between work stations throughout the manufacturing process. The larger the glass substrates 
are, the heavier they tend to be; the difficulties involved in transporting glass substrates between 
work stations increase with the size and weight of glass substrate. Third, the manufacturing 
equipment may very well become a problem as panels grow larger in size. More R&D resources 
need to be relocated to compensate for the lack of manufacturing equipment. Fourth, 
manufacturing process itself becomes more challenging when glass substrates grow larger in size. 
For example, the time required for filling liquid crystal into panels increases with the size of 
glass substrate
27
, and the defect rate also increases due to uneven filling. Fifth, the size of some 
components, such as back-light module and mother glass, increases with the size of panel. The 
transportation of these components is likely to make logistics more difficult when their size 
increases.  
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 Hoetker (2005; footnote 6)  
25
 Iwai, Y., 2002, The Key Components, Materials, and Skills of Flat Panel Display, Kogyo Chosakai Publishing Co., 
Ltd, Japan  
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 Tian, M., 2008, The development of flat panel display, Wu-nan, Taipei, Taiwan 
27
 Shih, W., Shih, C., Wang, J., & Yu, H., 2010, Harvard Business case: Chi Mei Optoelectronics, p.9 
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At least three additional major financial difficulties exist for manufacturing large glass 
substrates. First, more capital expenditure is required. The costs of building a latest generation 
plant are about $4 billion dollar, which is only one-third of the total costs. Not only is the 
required capital outlay high, the difficulty in achieving a decent return on investment is high as 
well. Second, the takt time, the gap in time between transitions from one work station to another, 
increases with the size of glass substrate. More idling time from the production line means more 
loss in efficiency and therefore less cost saving. Third, the manufacturing of large glass 
substrates requires more floor space. As a result, a larger, and hence more expensive, plant needs 
to be built to provide needed floor space.    
Despite the aforementioned technological and financial challenges, flat panel display 
makers still manage to grow the panel size (Kelly, 2000; Tian, 2008). There are at least two 
economic incentives associated with large display panels. First, the demands and profit margins 
for large displays are higher. Technologically, CRT cannot produce a monitor larger than 50 
inches; but the flat panel display technology makes possible the production of large size display, 
up to 103 inches. The birth of large size display creates a new demand for large television set and 
outdoor display. Second, panel makers can achieve economies of scale faster by processing one 
large mother glass substrate and then dividing it into multiple smaller panels later on than staring 
with only one small glass substrate that can only produce one single panel
28
. Producing large size 
panels can help flat panel display makers achieve better economics of scope as a large mother 
glass subtract can be cut into various panels sizes for different product applications.  
  
                                                 
28
 AUO Online: http://auo.com/?sn=442&lang=en-US 
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Industry players and market structure 
Figure 9. The distribution of distances to the technology frontier across years.  
 
As seen in Figure 9, there are more technological laggards increasing their distances to 
the technology frontier from year to year. This trend corroborates Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Khanna (1995) that technology competition is likely to result in long-tailed distribution of 
distance between the technological leader and laggards. While the technological leader and some 
technological laggards with superior technological capabilities innovate to deploy more 
advanced technologies, some technological laggards with inferior technological capabilities 
cluster at the tail end. The more the technology advances beyond the technology frontier, the 
more a technological laggard's distance grows.  
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CHAPTER 5 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the quantitative portion of my research. I begin by first describing 
the data and variables that test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. I then discuss the 
econometrics model that I use, the results I obtain from it, and post-hoc analysis I carry out.  
5.1 Data Description  
The primary data sources are 1) the 1991, and 1996-2008 issues of Flat Panel Display 
Applications--Trends and Forecasts by a Japanese research firm, and 2) and the 1991-2009 
annual reports on the flat panel display industry from Taiwan's Photonics Industry & Technology 
Development Association. These reports contain the product sales and production information 
for worldwide flat panel makers. Every annual issue provides production information for each 
flat panel maker in the world. The report includes plant generation, manufacturing technology, 
plant capacity, plant commencement date, size of panels produced, and transaction history if the 
plant has sold or ceased operation. Supplementary data sources include the Delphion database 
which provides makers' patenting activity, makers' annual reports, and news coverage from 
LexisNexis, Digital Times, Korea Times, The Nikkei Weekly. 
There are five types of technology used in manufacturing flat panel displays-- super 
twisted-nematic (STN), twisted-nematic (TN) , thin film transistors (TFT), organic light-emitting 
diode (OLED), plasma display panel (PDP). Given the technological similarities in STN, TN, 
and TFT, these three technologies are grouped into one LCD technology group, along with PDP 
& OLED technology groups. There are 148 technological laggard firms in the dataset. This 
yields a total of 536 firm-year observations.  
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5.2 Variables and Measures 
Table 3. Variables summary and their definition.  
Variable   Empirical proxy  Variable definition  
Dependent variable     
Strategic alternatives  Three strategic moves  
It contains three categories: not move, move towards, move to 
the technology frontier (year, by technology).  
Independent variables     
H1: Distance to the 
technology frontier  
 Generation difference  
The generation of the industry’s latest plant minus the 
generation of the focal technological laggard’s most advanced 
plant (year, by technology)  
H2: Innovation momentum  Number of moves   
The number of plants of higher generations that has been built 
(years, by technology) 
H3: Experience at the 
technology frontier 
 
Days spent at the 
technology frontier  
 
The sum of days that the focal technological laggard has spent 
at the technology frontier, i.e., having the industry's latest 
generation plant (year, by technology)  
H4: Prior window of 
competitive response 
 Time difference   
Of each generation, the commencement date difference 
between the first plant that adopts the generation and the second 
plant that adopts the same or newer generation (year, by 
technology), mean-centering. 
H5: Market competition in 
the current market  
 The sum of plants  
 
The sum of rivals’ plants of the same generation that the focal 
technological laggard shares (year, by technology). 
H6: Market share  Market share 
 
Total production value of the focal technological laggard  
divided by total production value of the industry (year, by 
technologies) 
H7: Innovation momentum* 
Market competition  
 
Innovation 
momentum*market 
competition 
 
Innovation momentum*market competition, following their 
prior definitions 
Control variables     
Interfirm relationships  Relationship counts  
The number of interfirm relationships that the focal 
technological laggard has with other rival firms, including 
technology transfer, technological licensing, cross licensing, 
plant sold, joint venture, and alliance (year) 
Industry growth  
Percentage increase in 
industry production value 
 
Annual percentage change of sum of production value of all 
firms in the industry (year, by technology) 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Variable   Empirical proxy  Variable definition  
Firm age  
Years spent since the 
entry  
 
Current year minus the year when the focal technological 
laggard built its first plant (year, by technology) 
Firm size  Production value  
The focal technological laggard's production value (year, by 
technology) 
Technology frontier 
competition 
 Number of firms  
The number of firms at the technology frontier (year, by 
technology). 
Patent stock   Patent counts  
The total number of patents that the focal technological laggard 
has had since its inception (year). 
Recent move  Dummy  
The number of years since the focal technological laggard has 
built a plant of higher generation (year, by technology). 
Current generation   Generation  
The current most advanced generation of plant that the focal 
technological laggard operates (year, by technology). 
Number of plants  Number of plants   
The number of plants owned by the focal technological laggard 
(year, by technology). 
Number of generations 
moved 
 Generation difference  
The generation difference between the focal technological 
laggard's current most advanced plant and last most advanced 
plant (year, by technology).  
Table 3 summarizes the conceptual variables and the operationalization of empirical data 
for hypothesis testing.  
Dependent variable 
 In this dissertation, a technological laggard can have three strategic alternatives, which 
correspond with three categories of dependent variable. A technological laggard can choose to 
not move from its current position, move towards, or move to the technology frontier. The first 
category, the empirical operation considers a technological laggard not moving from its current 
position if the generation of its leading plant is the same from last year, and the generation of this 
leading plant is lower than the latest generation in the industry.  
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 Second category, a technological laggard moves toward the technology frontier when it 
builds a new plant whose generation is less advanced than the most advanced plant of the same 
technology. The operationalization considers a technological laggard moving toward the 
technology frontier when its leading plant has a higher generation than its prior plants from the 
last year, but has a lower generation than the industry's latest plant. 
 Third category, the operationalization considers a technological laggard moving to the 
technology frontier when it builds a plant that has an equal or higher generation than the 
industry's current latest plant. 
 I forward the dependent variable by one year because the actual implementation of a 
technological laggard's plan may occur sometime after the initial decision is made.  
Independent variables 
Hypothesis 1: Distance to the technology frontier  
 The generation of a technological laggard's most advanced plant provides a proper 
measure of its technological capabilities. In order to manufacture a larger flat display panel and 
have cost advantage, a technological laggard needs a plant of higher generation, which requires 
better technological capabilities to build and operate. Hence, the highest generation defines the 
technology frontier in the industry. The distance to the technology frontier is the difference in 
generation between a technological laggard's and the industry's.  
the generation of a technological laggard's most advanced plant serves as a suitable proxy for its 
technological capabilities.  
Hypothesis 2: Innovation momentum  
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 Innovation momentum is defined as a consistent pattern of moving to higher generations. 
The measure of a technological laggard's innovation momentum is the count of plant generation 
changes that a technological has had since its inception (Chen et al., 2010).  
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Hypothesis 3: Experience at the technology frontier 
Experience at the technology frontier is the number of days that a technological laggard 
has zero distance to the technology frontier. That is, the number of days that a technological 
laggard's most advanced generation is equal to the leading generation in the industry.  
A short prior window of competitive response suggests that the first firm that adopts the latest 
generation plant is soon followed by another firm in adopting the same or next generation of 
technology. A prior window of competitive response is defined as the difference in the number 
of commencement months between the first plant that adopts the latest generation and the second 
plant that adopts the current latest or next generation of technology.  
Hypothesis 4: Prior window of competitive response  
 A short prior window of competitive response means the technological leader soon has 
another firm achieving the same level of technology as it does. A prior window of competitive 
response is, per each latest generation, the difference in the number of months between the first 
plant's commencement date and the second plant, or the difference in the number of months 
between the first plant commencement date and the current and next generation. Of the two 
temporal gaps, the shorter one is the empirical proxy for prior window of competitive response. 
This variable is mean-centering, by year and by technology.    
Hypothesis 5: Market competition in the current market  
 Market competition typically increases when more firms adopt the same technology 
(Adner & Snow, 2010; Ali, 1994). Market competition in the current market is defined as the 
sum of rivals’ plants with which a technological laggard has shared the same generations (Aiken 
& West, 1991; Lerner, 1997; Shan, 1990). 
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Hypothesis 6: Market share  
 The market share is a firm's annual production value of a given technology divided by the 
industry's total production value in the same year, of the same technology Eggers (2009).   
Control variables 
The control variables include interfirm relationships, industry growth, firm age, firm size, 
technology frontier competition, patent stock, recent move, current generation, number of plants, 
and number of generation moved. 
Interfirm relationships 
Interfirm relationships count the number of deals (including technological licensing, 
cross-licensing, plant sold, joint venture, and alliance) that a technological laggard has with rival 
firms in a given year. The interfirm relationship is likely to affect  the value that  is  appropriable  
from  rival  firms'  innovation  and  the  value  of  the  focal  firm's  innovation (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Singh & Mitchell, 2005). 
Industry growth 
 Industry growth may affect a technological laggard's behavior in technology competition 
(Derfus et al., 2008). Annual percentage change of the sum of production value for all firms in 
the industry is the measure of industry growth for each technology. The composition of market 
share in a mature industry may be different than market share in a nascent industry (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 2001; Mazzucato & Semmler, 1999), necessitating the control of industry growth.  
Firm age 
 A technological laggard's experience is likely to affect its capability of managing 
technology competition, and its absorptive capacity to new technological knowledge. Age is 
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operationalized as the number of years that have passed since the technological laggard 
established its first plant in the flat panel display industry.  
Firm size 
 Given that a large technological laggard can anticipate higher economic gains through 
commercializing the innovation, this study controls production value that a technological laggard 
has as a proxy for firm size. 
Technology frontier competition 
If there are already a number of firms at the technology frontier, a technological laggard 
might not be as inclined to move to the technology frontier. Hence this study controls the number 
of firms currently at the technology frontier.  
Patent stock 
 Patent counts (in 100) often serve as a proxy for a firm's ability to innovate (Kim & 
Vonortas, 2006; Sakakibara & Branstetter, 2001; Somaya, 2003). The proxy for a technological 
laggard's ability to innovate is the number of patents that it has been granted since the firm birth. 
The patents are limited to the section of F21V, G02F, G09G, G09F, H01J, H01L, H04N, H05B, 
H05H under international patent class (Hoetker 2001; Spencer, 1997). 
Recent move 
Recent move is the number of years that have passed since the last plant built by a 
technological laggard. A recent new plant is likely to financially influence a technological 
laggard's next technology deployment decision, and leads to some adjustment in its product 
portfolio (Lee et al., 2011; Livengood & Reger, 2010; Tang, 1988).  
  
58 
 
Current generation 
The independent variable as represented by distance to the technology frontier is a 
relative term. Even though the distance is equal to one, the interpretation can be very different 
when the most advanced generation is G9 than when the most advanced generation is G2. In 
order to address this omission, the model controls for the generation of a technological laggard's 
most advanced plant. 
Number of plants 
Given that a higher number of plants can lead to better economies of scale and scope, a 
technological laggard is therefore more likely to achieve higher return on innovation. This study 
adds the number of plants that a technological laggard has in a given year and for a given 
technology to control for the efficiency effect (Adner  &  Zemsky,  2005;   Demsetz,  1973;  
Mas-Ruiz  &  Ruiz-Moreno,  2011; Szymanski,  Bharadwaj,  &  Varadarajan,  1993). 
Number of generations moved 
The independent variable innovation momentum measures how many times a 
technological has moved. This measure treats each move equally even when some moves span 
more generations than others. In order to compensate for this omission, the model controls for 
the difference in generation by each move.  
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5.3 The Multinomial Logistic Model 
The multinomial logistic model is suitable for testing the hypotheses in this study because 
a technological laggard has three alternative moves available to it (Greene, 2007: 859)
29
. The 
dependent variable consists of j strategic moves, and the regressors consist of independent 
variables and a constant that represent a technological laggard i's organizational and 
environmental characteristics. The model omits the error term    because it performs estimation. 
The multinomial logistic model for a technological laggard's choice of strategic moves can be 
expressed as follows, 
           
         
              
            
The multinomial logistic model gives an estimation of probabilities of J+1 strategic 
moves for a technological laggard with    characteristics. Greene (2007: 860) suggests a simpler 
model that assumes the constant term   =0 after normalization. Hence, the multinomial logistic 
model that estimates probability of a technological laggard i's j strategic move is, 
          
     
            
              
          
 
            
  
Prob(Y=0) is the baseline model, and J=0 is the baseline category. Of the dependent variable, 
the strategic moves j where j=1, 2, ..., J pair with the baseline category. The statistical interest is 
to find out the probabilities of a technological laggard i with certain characteristics    choosing a 
                                                 
29
 In my conversation with a manger from the flat panel display industry, he points out that, when determining 
whether to build a new plant, his firm first considers the major rival firms' potential move. For instance, AUO first 
speculates whether Samsung's, its major rival, new plant will be the industry's next generation. Assuming that 
Samsung moves to the next generation, how should AUO enact its plant building plan accordingly. Therefore, this 
decision process is more akin to one-stage scenario where all alternatives are available at the same time. A 
multinomial logistic model is thus considered a more suitable model to simulate manager's decision process. 
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specific strategic move j over the baseline category (J=0). Given that a technological laggard can 
choose its strategic move from category j (j=1, 2, ..., J) or category (J=0), there is the log odds 
that the choice is j. The baseline-category logistic model (Agresti, 2007:174) with regressor:  
    
  
    
                              
Each category j (j=1, 2, ..., J-1) has their baseline-category logistic model. Hence there 
are J-1 equations, and the predicted log odds vary with models. In order to compare two 
estimated probabilities of two categories other than the baseline category, the logistic model for 
comparing an arbitrary pair of category 1 and 2 is (Agresti, 2007: 174), 
    
  
  
      
     
     
      
  
  
      
  
  
            
The above equation reports that the difference of estimated probabilities between category 1 and 
2 for a technological laggard i is          . 
Because of panel dataset, the multinomial logistic model for hypothesis testing specifies 
the standard errors that allow for intra-group correlation. Thus, within group observations may 
not necessarily have independency, whereas between group observations still maintain 
independency
30
.  
The use of multinomial logistic model requires a critical assumption-- independence of 
irrelevant alternative (IIA) property (Hausman & McFadden, 1984). Essentially, the likelihood 
that a technological laggard chooses a given move should be independent of the likelihood that it 
may choose other moves. Therefore, the multinomial logistic model should pass the test of IIA 
first before further testing. The statistical method used in verifying IIA assumption estimates for 
the unconstrained model and the constrained model. The unconstrained model u and constrained 
                                                 
30
 Stata 11 base reference manual, Vol. 3  
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model c have  's and covariance's to calculate test statistics:        
          
        
          . 
Table 4. IIA assumption test results.  
Unconstrained model 
vs. 
Constrained model I 
(excluding "not 
moving") 
Constrained model II 
(excluding "moving 
towards") 
Constrained model III 
(excluding "moving 
to") 
     
  10.866 0.2416 353.12 
p-value 0.9999 1 9.78     
The null hypothesis is that IIA assumption is not violated (Hausman & McFadden, 1984; 
McFadden, 1987; Small & Haiao, 1985). Table 4 reports the test statistics and their p-value. IIA 
assumption is held for not moving and moving towards groups, but the assumption is rejected for 
moving to group. Given that the null hypothesis is rejected, I then perform regression on the 
same dataset using multinomial probit which does not require IIA assumption. Because the 
results from both multinomial probit model and multinomial logistic model are the same
31
, I still 
rely on multinomial logistic model as my main choice of statistical testing model.  
                                                 
31
 The output of multinomial probit model is in Robustness check section.  
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Table 5. Summary statistics.  
  Variable   Count Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1 A technological laggard's move 
 
548 1.2 0.46 1 3 1 
    
2 Interfirm relationships 
 
680 0.01 0.09 0 1 -0.04 1 
   
3 Industry growth 
 
680 0.22 0.17 -0.1 0.49 -0.06 -0.03 1 
  
4 Firm age 
 
663 5.56 4.39 0 19 -0.15 0.02 0.1 1 
 
5 Firm size 
 
680 390.04 868.39 0 8076 0.29 0.05 0.13 0.12 1 
6 Technology frontier competition 
 
680 2.37 1.58 1 6 0.06 0.04 -0.63 -0.11 -0.06 
7 Patent stock 
 
677 741.83 1915.54 1 13997 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.3 
8 Recent move 
 
680 3.57 3.88 0 18 -0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.41 -0.21 
9 Current generation  
 
633 1.88 1.1 1 8 0.08 0.07 0.16 0 0.55 
10 Number of plants 
 
592 2.43 2.26 1 15 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.57 
11 Number of generations moved 
 
549 0.15 0.43 0 2.5 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.13 
12 Distance to the technology frontier H1 633 3.46 2.12 0.2 7.5 -0.22 -0.05 0.16 0.29 -0.28 
13 Innovation momentum H2 680 2.06 1.36 1 10 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.4 0.44 
14 Experience at the technology frontier H3 680 270.44 539.71 0 2556 0.1 -0.03 0.07 0.39 0.28 
15 Prior window of competitive response H4 633 36.96 92.69 -111.33 167 -0.12 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.14 
16 Market competition in the current market H5 633 71.97 36.08 3 179 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.25 
17 Market share H6 680 0.01 0.02 0 0.19 0.39 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.8 
 
  
63 
 
Table 5 (cont.) 
  Variable   6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 A technological laggard's move 
             
2 Interfirm relationships 
             
3 Industry growth 
             
4 Firm age 
             
5 Firm size 
             
6 Technology frontier competition 
 
1 
           
7 Patent stock 
 
0.02 1 
          
8 Recent move 
 
-0.1 -0.08 1 
         
9 Current generation  
 
-0.06 0.32 -0.52 1 
        
10 Number of plants 
 
0.03 0.27 -0.19 0.39 1 
       
11 Number of generations moved 
 
0.02 -0.03 -0.39 0.37 0.23 1 
      
12 Distance to the technology frontier H1 -0.41 -0.22 0.46 -0.44 -0.33 -0.23 1 
     
13 Innovation momentum H2 -0.06 0.22 -0.34 0.54 0.54 0.34 -0.21 1 
    
14 Experience at the technology frontier H3 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.24 0.22 0.08 -0.2 0.4 1 
   
15 Prior window of competitive response H4 -0.06 -0.27 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.24 0.03 0.19 1 
  
16 Market competition in the current market H5 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.64 0.17 0.03 0.56 0.16 0.05 1 
 
17 Market share H6 0.06 0.3 -0.19 0.36 0.55 0.13 -0.43 0.33 0.22 -0.17 0.22 1 
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5.4 Hypothesis Testing Results 
Table 5 reports summary statistics
32
.  
Table 6. Number of observations of technological laggard's strategic moves (forwarded by 
one year), by dominant technology.  
 Technology 
LCD OLED PDP Total 
Strategic moves 
Not move  513 36 9 558 
Move towards  100 9 8 117 
Move to  17 2 4 23 
Total  630 (90.26%) 47 (6.73%) 21 (3.01%) 698 (100%) 
 
From Table 6, LCD is the most popular technology for producing flat panel displays 
during the observation period 1991 to 2008. LCD technology subgroup includes 90% of total 
observations, indicating that the LCD technology is the dominant technology for the flat panel 
display industry. Given the distinct technological characteristics and development path between 
LCD and other technologies as well as the dominance of the LCD (Eggers, 2009), I decide to test 
hypotheses with observations from the LCD technology, and save the observations from OLED 
for later robustness check. 
  
                                                 
32
 The correlation between market share and distance behind the technology frontier (viz. organizational capabilities 
proxy) is 0.33, corresponding with the theoretical implication that the market share is beyond organizational 
capabilities.  
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Table 7. Moves by technological laggards across year. 
Year 
Not 
move 
Move 
towards 
Move to Total 
1995 22 2 2 26 
1996 25 6 1 32 
1997 31 5 4 40 
1998 29 8 0 37 
1999 40 4 1 45 
2000 37 7 3 47 
2001 41 5 1 47 
2002 42 10 1 53 
2003 50 9 1 60 
2004 61 5 0 66 
2005 62 6 1 69 
2006 58 9 1 68 
2007 44 8 1 53 
Total 542 84 17 643 
 
Before reviewing the findings from hypothesis testing, I first provide the dynamics of the 
flat panel display industry with respect to the popularity of three moves-- not move, move 
towards, and move to the technology frontier. Table 7 reports counts corresponding with each 
strategic move. Note that the observation years in the current data range from 1989 to 2008. The 
flat panel display industry before 1995 has only Gen 1 plants. Thus, by the definition of 
technological leader and laggards in the current study, firms before 1995 are all considered 
technological leaders and hence are not reported in Table 7.   
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Table 8. Multinomial logistic results--Simple models (LCD technology only) 
  Base: Not move Base: Move toward Base: Move to 
  Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
  Move 
towards 
Move to Not move Move to Not move Move 
towards 
Interfirm relationships  -12.37*** -7.463*** 12.37*** 4.911*** 7.463*** -4.911*** 
  (-19.54) (-4.74) (19.54) (3.43) (4.74) (-3.43) 
        
Industry growth  -0.286 -2.740 0.286 -2.454 2.740 2.454 
  (-0.32) (-0.75) (0.32) (-0.67) (0.75) (0.67) 
        
Firm age  -0.186** -0.768** 0.186** -0.582* 0.768** 0.582* 
  (-3.18) (-3.27) (3.18) (-2.54) (3.27) (2.54) 
        
Firm size   0.000159 0.0000545 -0.000159 -0.000104 -0.0000545 0.000104 
 (0.86) (0.19) (-0.86) (-0.52) (-0.19) (0.52) 
        
Technology frontier 
competition 
 0.125 -0.248 -0.125 -0.372 0.248 0.372 
 (1.15) (-0.48) (-1.15) (-0.71) (0.48) (0.71) 
        
Patent stock   0.00000454 -0.000202 -0.00000454 -0.000207 0.000202 0.000207 
 (0.06) (-1.16) (-0.06) (-1.18) (1.16) (1.18) 
        
Recent move  -0.0744 0.427+ 0.0744 0.502* -0.427+ -0.502* 
 (-1.27) (1.72) (1.27) (1.99) (-1.72) (-1.99) 
        
Current generation   -0.352+ -1.049* 0.352+ -0.697 1.049* 0.697 
 (-1.65) (-2.52) (1.65) (-1.63) (2.52) (1.63) 
        
Number of plants  0.142* 0.454** -0.142* 0.312* -0.454** -0.312* 
  (2.11) (3.26) (-2.11) (2.57) (-3.26) (-2.57) 
        
Number of 
generations moved 
 -1.630*** -0.0770 1.630*** 1.553+ 0.0770 -1.553+ 
 (-3.69) (-0.09) (3.69) (1.93) (0.09) (-1.93) 
        
Distance to the 
technology frontier 
H1 0.248* -2.603** -0.248* -2.851** 2.603** 2.851** 
 (1.97) (-3.03) (-1.97) (-3.19) (3.03) (3.19) 
        
Innovation momentum 
 
H2 0.289+ 1.071* -0.289+ 0.782 -1.071* -0.782 
 (1.77) (2.00) (-1.77) (1.54) (-2.00) (-1.54) 
        
Experience at the 
technology frontier 
H3 0.000649* 0.00180* -0.000649* 0.00115 -0.00180* -0.00115 
 (2.35) (2.57) (-2.35) (1.51) (-2.57) (-1.51) 
        
Prior window of 
competitive response 
H4 -0.00369* -0.000149 0.00369* 0.00354 0.000149 -0.00354 
 (-2.00) (-0.02) (2.00) (0.47) (0.02) (-0.47) 
        
Market competition in 
the current market 
H4 0.00233 -0.0282*** -0.00233 -0.0305*** 0.0282*** 0.0305*** 
 (0.45) (-3.48) (-0.45) (-3.39) (3.48) (3.39) 
        
Market share  H6 17.71 24.86 -17.71 7.145 -24.86 -7.145 
  (1.41) (1.62) (-1.41) (0.83) (-1.62) (-0.83) 
        
Constant  -1.996* 3.126 1.996* 5.123* -3.126 -5.123* 
  (-2.32) (1.35) (2.32) (1.99) (-1.35) (-1.99) 
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 
Pseudo R2  0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 
z statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8 present the results of multinomial logistic regression, with the dependent variable 
as a technological laggard’s alternative moves—not moving from its current position, moving 
towards, or moving to the technology frontier.  
The dependent variable has multiple categories. Each multinomial model chooses one 
category as a base group, and examines whether a given group is more likely to be selected by 
the focal firm than the base group. For instance, Model 1a and Mode lb assume 'not move' as the 
base group. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the focal firm is more (less) likely to 
select an alternative move (e.g., 'moving towards' or 'moving to') than the base group (e.g., not 
moving).  
In Table 8, Models 1-3 report the results of hypothesis testing. Figures 10-15 are model 
estimation. I explain the finding of each hypothesis using supporting figures.  
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Figure 10. Model prediction for Hypothesis 1. 
 
As H1move to proposed, a technological laggard further behind the technology frontier is 
less likely to move to the technology frontier. Model 3 provides the statistical support. In Figure 
10, a laggard's probability of moving to the technology frontier decreases with its distance. 
As H1move towards proposed, a technological laggard further behind the technology frontier 
is more likely to move towards the technology frontier as opposed to moving to the technology 
frontier. Model 2 provides the statistical support. In Figure 10, a laggard's probability of moving 
towards the technology frontier increases with its distance to the technology frontier.  
As H1not move proposed, a technological laggard further behind the technology frontier is 
more likely to not move from its current position as opposed to moving to the technology frontier. 
Model 1 provides the statistical support. In Figure 10, a laggard's probability of not moving from 
the current position increases with its distance when it is relatively close to the technology 
frontier.  
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Figure 11. Model prediction for Hypothesis 2. 
 
As H2move towards or to proposed, a technological laggard with higher innovation momentum 
is more likely to move to a new position. Model 1 provides the statistical support. In Figure 11, a 
technological laggard with higher innovation momentum is more likely to move towards or to 
the technology frontier.  
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Figure 12. Model prediction for Hypothesis 3. 
 
As H3move to proposed, a technological laggard with experience at the technology frontier 
is more likely to move to the technology frontier. Model 1 provides the statistical support. In 
Figure 12, a laggard's probability of moving to the technology frontier increases with its 
experience at the technology frontier.  
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Figure 13. Model prediction for Hypothesis 4. 
 
Hypothesis 4move to suggests that a technological laggard is more likely to move to the 
technology frontier when the prior window of competitive response increases. Model 3 fails to 
support this hypothesis. The hypothesis testing results suggest that prior window of competitive 
response has no effect on a laggard's likelihood of moving to the technology frontier. Figure 13 
shows post-estimation of Model 3.  
One possible explanation is that technological laggards in the flat panel display industry 
have a better mechanism to predict when the next generation plant will be in service. Like 
Moore's law in the semiconductor industry, Nishimura's law in the flat panel display industry 
predicts that the size of glass substrate grows 1.8 times in every three years
33
. The size of glass 
substrate has been growing at rate that Nishimura's law predicts for the past 20 years. Thus, the 
                                                 
33
 Tian M., 2008, Technical Development of Flat Panel Display, Wunan Book Co., Ltd, Taipei, Taiwan. 
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existence of a better mechanism weakens the argument for using the prior window of 
competitive response to predict the progression of the technology frontier.  
Another possible explanation, the length of window may not be wide enough to allow a 
technological laggard to appropriate enough economic rents to justify the costs of moving to the 
technology frontier. In the current dataset, the maximum window is 167 days above the average 
length of window of competitive response. In the flat panel display industry, 167-day window is 
unlikely to allow a technological laggard to appropriate enough economic rents. Thus I conclude 
that the current dataset may not have enough variance on prior window of competitive response 
to test Hypothesis 4.  
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Figure 14. Model prediction for Hypothesis 5.  
 
Hypothesis 5move towards or to suggests that a technological laggard in a competitive market 
is likely to move to a new position. Model 1 fails to provide statistical support. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, a technological laggard is less likely to move from its current position when market 
competition in its market increases. Figure 14 provides a graphical illustration. Indeed, managers 
may be motivated, but are not able to move to a new position due to resource limitation (Zajac & 
Kraatz, 1993). Not only does an action without sufficient organizational support have a higher 
likelihood of failure, it is also likely to adversely affect its current operation.  
Notably, the findings from Model 3 suggest that, if a technological laggard moves to a 
new position, it is more likely to move towards than to the technology frontier. The theoretical 
interpretation is that moving towards typically contains lower risk than moving to the technology 
frontier.  
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Figure 15. Model prediction for Hypothesis 6. 
 
Hypothesis 6move to suggests that a technological laggard with a greater market share is 
less likely to move to the technology frontier. Model 1 fails to support this hypothesis. The 
findings from Model 1 suggest that a technological laggard with a greater market share is more 
likely to move to the technology frontier. In Figure 15, a laggard's probability of moving the 
technology frontier increases with market share, and its probability of not moving decreases.  
A possible explanation for the trends in Figure 6 is that return on innovation is likely to 
increase with market share (Mas-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 2011; Szymanski et al., 1993; Tang, 
2006). In the process of building a newer generation plant, a number of investments are at fixed 
costs. A technological laggard may have a better chance of recouping its investments if it has a 
greater market share (Blundell et al., 1999; Demsetz, 1973; Mas-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 2011). A 
large market share usually has a positive effect on innovation output (Lunn & Martin, 1986). 
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Thus, a laggard with a greater market share has a higher probability of moving to the technology 
frontier.  
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Table 9. Multinomial logistic results--Complete models (LCD technology only) 
  Base: Not move Base: Move toward Base: Move to 
  Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b 
  Move 
towards 
Move to Not move Move to Not move Move 
towards 
Interfirm relationships  -13.45*** -8.525*** 13.45*** 4.926*** 8.525*** -4.926*** 
  (-21.54) (-5.67) (21.54) (3.63) (5.67) (-3.63) 
        
Industry growth  -0.260 -2.632 0.260 -2.372 2.632 2.372 
  (-0.30) (-0.73) (0.30) (-0.65) (0.73) (0.65) 
        
Firm age  -0.203*** -0.791** 0.203*** -0.588* 0.791** 0.588* 
  (-3.65) (-3.14) (3.65) (-2.37) (3.14) (2.37) 
        
Firm size   0.000150 0.0000925 -0.000150 -0.0000576 -0.0000925 0.0000576 
 (0.65) (0.28) (-0.65) (-0.30) (-0.28) (0.30) 
        
Technology frontier 
competition 
 0.133 -0.242 -0.133 -0.375 0.242 0.375 
 (1.25) (-0.47) (-1.25) (-0.71) (0.47) (0.71) 
        
Patent stock   0.0000455 -0.000166 -0.0000455 -0.000212 0.000166 0.000212 
 (0.62) (-0.93) (-0.62) (-1.19) (0.93) (1.19) 
        
Recent move  -0.0644 0.446+ 0.0644 0.510+ -0.446+ -0.510+ 
 (-1.13) (1.74) (1.13) (1.94) (-1.74) (-1.94) 
        
Current generation   -0.387+ -1.109* 0.387+ -0.722+ 1.109* 0.722+ 
 (-1.70) (-2.47) (1.70) (-1.65) (2.47) (1.65) 
        
Number of plants  0.153+ 0.482** -0.153+ 0.329* -0.482** -0.329* 
  (1.88) (2.81) (-1.88) (2.22) (-2.81) (-2.22) 
        
Number of 
generations moved 
 -1.622*** -0.165 1.622*** 1.456+ 0.165 -1.456+ 
 (-3.72) (-0.21) (3.72) (1.94) (0.21) (-1.94) 
        
Distance to the 
technology frontier 
H1 0.239+ -2.753** -0.239+ -2.993** 2.753** 2.993** 
 (1.90) (-3.11) (-1.90) (-3.22) (3.11) (3.22) 
        
Innovation momentum 
 
H2 0.912* 1.514+ -0.912* 0.602 -1.514+ -0.602 
 (2.32) (1.86) (-2.32) (0.77) (-1.86) (-0.77) 
        
Experience at the 
technology frontier 
H3 0.000689* 0.00181* -0.000689* 0.00112 -0.00181* -0.00112 
 (2.46) (2.42) (-2.46) (1.39) (-2.42) (-1.39) 
        
Prior window of 
competitive response 
H4 -0.00348* 0.000169 0.00348* 0.00365 -0.000169 -0.00365 
 (-1.97) (0.02) (1.97) (0.47) (-0.02) (-0.47) 
        
Market competition in 
the current market 
H4 0.0149+ -0.0175 -0.0149+ -0.0324* 0.0175 0.0324* 
 (1.61) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-2.41) (1.52) (2.41) 
        
Market share  H6 16.46 22.37 -16.46 5.913 -22.37 -5.913 
  (1.23) (1.52) (-1.23) (0.74) (-1.52) (-0.74) 
        
Innovation momentum 
* market competition 
H7 -0.00605+ -0.00492 0.00605+ 0.00113 0.00492 -0.00113 
 (-1.73) (-0.87) (1.73) (0.20) (0.87) (-0.20) 
        
Constant  -3.069*** 2.600 3.069*** 5.670* -2.600 -5.670* 
  (-3.40) (1.13) (3.40) (2.14) (-1.13) (-2.14) 
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 
Pseudo R2  0.2775 0.2775 0.2775 0.2775 0.2775 0.2775 
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z statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Hypothesis 7move to or towards proposes that, the effect of market competition on a 
technological laggard's decision to move to a new position is likely to be stronger when a laggard 
innovation momentum is high. In order to test H7move to or towards, I add an interactive term 
(innovation momentum*market competition) to the simple model. Table 9 shows Model 4-6, the 
complete model for hypothesis testing. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the coefficient of innovation momentum* market competition 
in Model 4a is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that market competition 
negatively moderates the relationship between innovation momentum and a technological 
laggard's decision to move to a new position. Yet, the model estimation by Model 4 shows a 
trend that supports H7move to or towards. In order to reconcile the conflicts, I first provide graphical 
evidence that corroborates H7move to or towards, and then explain why the coefficient for the 
interactive term turns negative.  
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Figure 16. Model prediction for Hypothesis 7. 
 
 
In Figure 16, a technological laggard experiencing higher market competition (above 75th 
percentile) has a lower probability of not moving from its current position. This finding is in line 
with competition literature and H5move  towards or to. In examining the probability of moving towards 
the technology frontier, when market competition is at a high level, a laggard with higher 
innovation momentum has a higher probability of moving towards the technology frontier. This 
observation indeed corroborates H7move to or towards.  
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Figure 17. Model prediction for Hypothesis 7. 
 
 
Figure 17 reports the estimated probability with a more extreme definition of high and 
low market competition. The difference in probability further widens for all three strategic 
alternatives, suggesting a positive effect of market competition on the relationship between 
innovation momentum and a technological laggard's likelihood of moving to a new position. 
This finding again corroborates H7move to or towards. 
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Table 10. Estimated probability comparison. 
    Innovation momentum 
  Market competition =1 =5 =10 
Probability of moving 
towards 
p(75) 0.0776 0.648 0.7176 
p(25) 0.04 0.5 0.613 
Probability difference p(75)-p(25) 0.0376 0.148 0.1046 
Probability of moving 
towards 
p(90) 0.1042 0.7105 0.7693 
p(10) 0.0308 0.4414 0.5764 
Probability difference p(90)-p(10) 0.0734 0.2691 0.1929 
Table 10 summarizes part of estimated probabilities from Model 4. Table 10 brings to our 
attention at least two importance pieces of information in terms of examining the hypothesis 
testing results. First, when innovation momentum increases from 1 to 5, the probability increase 
for p(90) is 0.61 (=0.7105-0.1042) and for p(75) is 0.57 (=0.648-0.0776); both of them increase 
more than 0.46 of p(25) and 0.41 of p(10). Again, a higher level of market competition further 
enhances innovation momentum's effect on increasing a technological laggard's probability of 
moving towards the technology frontier. Second, in an attempt to explain why the interactive 
term has a negative coefficient, I point out that the value of coefficient is very low (-0.00605), 
suggesting the negative effect may not produce a noticeable effect until innovation momentum 
reaches a high value. In Table 10, when innovation momentum increases from 5 to 10, the 
difference in probability between high and low market competition (p(75) and p(25)) decrease by 
0.0434 (=0.148-0.1046). The same change also occur in another group where I define higher 
competition as p(90) and low competition as p(10). The difference in probability decreases by 
even more-- 0.0762 (0.2691-0.1929). Hence, the consistent pattern is that, despite a high level of 
market competition, the innovation momentum's effect on a laggard's probability of moving 
towards the technology frontier gradually weakens.  
The empirical proxy for innovation momentum is the number of moves that a 
technological laggard has performed since its entry. In explaining why a technological laggard 
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with high innovation momentum slows down as it moves towards the technology frontier, I need 
to highlight the limit of the dataset. In the flat panel display industry, the average move is usually 
0.5 or 1 generation. The current maximum generation in the dataset is 8.5. So, after moving up 
its plant generation for 8 or 9 times, a laggard probably already runs out of positions that are 
behind the technology frontier, unless it leapfrogs the technological leader. H1move to and H3move 
has discussed part of the market and technological difference between moving towards and to the 
technology frontier, and why it is difficult.  
Findings from Model 4 can also help to explain why H5move  towards or to fails to receive the 
statistical support. The finding from Model 1 (simple model) suggests that market competition 
has no effect on a technological laggard's probability of moving to a new position. A closer look 
at Model 4 (complete model) suggests that market competition is more likely to trigger the move 
if a technological laggard has higher innovation momentum. That is, the capabilities of moving 
to a new position is likely to be critical in a laggard's technology deployment decision. This 
finding furhter underscores the importance of organizational capabilities in the competitive 
dynamics literature.  
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5.5 Robustness Check 
To ensure model robustness, I perform five checks. The first two checks involve using 
different variable operationalizations. First, the competitive dyanmics literature suggests that an 
aggressive firm is likely to demonstrate high innovation momentum (Ferrier, 2001). A special 
feature in the flat panel display industry is that makers rarely close their older plants after a new 
plant is built. Following the empirical measure of aggressiveness, the proxy for innovation 
momentum is the generation difference between a technological laggard's most and least 
advanced plants (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011). The proxy is mean-centering. The model 
using this new proxy for innovation momentum reports the same results as simple models 
(Model 1-3). Second, an alternative to approximating market competition is Herfindhal index 
(Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Derfus et al., 2008). Hence the market competition is equal to the sum 
of squared market share in a given year, given technology. The model using Herfindhal index 
reports the same results as simple models (Model 1-3).  
The next two checks use diffrent statistical models. First, I use multinomial probit model, 
and the findings from multinomial probit and logit model are consistent with each other. The 
consistenance also supports the use of multinomial logit model even when the data structure fails 
to uphold the IIA assumption. Second, the dataset for prior hypothesis testing is limited to only 
technological laggards. In addressing the concern regarding sample selection, I employ two-stage 
models. The first regression model is a probit model that I use to test whether a firm is a 
technological leader or laggard, and retrive the inverse Mills ratio. I then add the inverse Mills 
ratio as a control variable to the second model, which is a multinominal logit model with a 3-
category dependent variable (Heckman, 1979; Shipilov & Li, 2008; Yang, Lin & Lin, 2010). 
This two-stage model reports the same results as simple models (Model 1-3).  
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The last check uses the same multinominal logit model (Model 1-3), and limites the 
sample to technological laggards using the OLED technology. Due to a low number of 
technological laggards that actually move to the technology frontier (n=3), the model that 
compares moving to the technology frontier with other two strategic alternatives fails to 
converge. Yet, the model that compares not moving from the current position with moving 
towards the technology frontier still produces the same results as the simple models (Model 1-3).  
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CHAPTER 6 
POST HOC ANALYSIS 
6.1 Breakdown of the Market Share: Segment Share 
The findings from Model 1 are opposite of the Hypothesis 6move to's prediction that a 
technological laggard with a greater market share is less likely to move to the technology frontier. 
An alternative view suggests that a large market share may increase return on innovation, 
encouraging a laggard to move to the technology frontier (Adner & Zemsky, 2005; Blundell et 
al., 1999; Demsetz, 1973; Mas-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 2011; Szymanski et al., 1993). The prior 
variable operationalization of market share assumes that production value is the same across the 
board for different sizes of display panel. Because return on innovation may vary with panel 
sizes, it is of theoretical interest to understand how segment share
34
 associates with a laggard's 
technology deployment decision (Moore, 1991).  
I obtain a dataset that contains shipment value and/or volume information and break 
down into segments. This sub-dataset contains shipment value and/or volume for different panel 
sizes, ranging from 0.3-inch to 60-inch. The observations period cover 1997 to 2007. I categorize 
display panels into segments based on their sizes. The large display segment has display panels 
whose sizes are above 90 percentile of the sample's panel sizes; the small display segment has 
display panels whose sizes are below 10 percentile of the sample's panel sizes in a given year, 
given technology.  
Following the segment share definition by Cool & Dierickx (1993), I operationalize a 
technological laggard's segment share-- its shipment value (or volume) in the segment as a 
                                                 
34
 Different from market share, which is a sum of a firm's shipment value proportion to the entire market, a segment 
share specifically refers to the proportion a firm's shipment value of a given market segment.  
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proportion of the industry's total shipment value (or volume) in the segment j in a given year, 
given technology (Cool & Dierickx, 1993). The variable is segment share
35
.  
                                             
          
           
   
 
             
In Table 11, Models 7-9 include segment share variables in addition to the original 
variables from Model 1 (simple model). The discussion focuses on interpreting results from 
Models 7-9.  
                                                 
35
 Cook and Dierickx (1993) also propose the measure of segment weight as the proportion of its shipment value (or 
volume) in the segment j as a percentage of the total panel shipment value (or volume).  
                                            
          
           
   
 
  
             
The major difference between segment share and segment weight is the focus of comparing target. The variable 
segment share represents a technological laggard's external focus on market competition, examining its market 
position in relation to the industry as a whole; whereas the variable segment weight represents a technological 
laggard's internal focus on its product portfolio. I adopt the measure of segment share because this study has its 
focus set on external competition.  
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Table 11. Multinomial logistic results (LCD technology only) 
  Base: Not move Base: Move toward Base: Move to 
  Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a Model 8b Model 9a Model 9b 
  Move 
towards 
Move to Not move Move to Not move Move 
towards 
Interfirm relationships  -25.08*** 696.5*** 25.08*** 721.6*** -696.5*** -721.6*** 
  (-26.62) (25.11) (26.62) (26.16) (-25.11) (-26.16) 
        
Industry growth  -0.251 19.62** 0.251 19.87** -19.62** -19.87** 
  (-0.13) (2.73) (0.13) (2.83) (-2.73) (-2.83) 
        
Firm age  -0.388+ -54.18*** 0.388+ -53.79*** 54.18*** 53.79*** 
  (-1.86) (-40.64) (1.86) (-41.28) (40.64) (41.28) 
        
Firm size   0.000219 0.0685*** -0.000219 0.0683*** -0.0685*** -0.0683*** 
 (1.50) (46.86) (-1.50) (47.01) (-46.86) (-47.01) 
        
Technology frontier 
competition 
 0.103 -34.01*** -0.103 -34.12*** 34.01*** 34.12*** 
 (0.54) (-32.20) (-0.54) (-30.96) (32.20) (30.96) 
        
Patent stock   0.000000603 -0.104*** -
0.000000603 
-0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.00) (-28.38) (-0.00) (-28.43) (28.38) (28.43) 
        
Recent move  0.215 97.09*** -0.215 96.88*** -97.09*** -96.88*** 
 (1.11) (31.26) (-1.11) (31.48) (-31.26) (-31.48) 
        
Current generation   -0.477 -284.1*** 0.477 -283.6*** 284.1*** 283.6*** 
 (-1.27) (-47.86) (1.27) (-48.21) (47.86) (48.21) 
        
Number of plants  0.322*** 85.73*** -0.322*** 85.41*** -85.73*** -85.41*** 
  (3.97) (47.53) (-3.97) (48.05) (-47.53) (-48.05) 
        
Number of 
generations moved 
 -1.874** -19.65*** 1.874** -17.78*** 19.65*** 17.78*** 
 (-3.08) (-9.45) (3.08) (-7.92) (9.45) (7.92) 
        
Distance to the 
technology frontier 
H1 0.321 -464.6*** -0.321 -464.9*** 464.6*** 464.9*** 
 (1.55) (-43.91) (-1.55) (-43.84) (43.91) (43.84) 
        
Innovation momentum 
 
H2 0.432 144.1*** -0.432 143.7*** -144.1*** -143.7*** 
 (1.08) (25.48) (-1.08) (26.09) (-25.48) (-26.09) 
        
Experience at the 
technology frontier 
H3 0.00128* 0.213*** -0.00128* 0.212*** -0.213*** -0.212*** 
 (2.54) (25.83) (-2.54) (26.06) (-25.83) (-26.06) 
        
Prior window of 
competitive response 
H4 -0.00108 0.201*** 0.00108 0.203*** -0.201*** -0.203*** 
 (-0.34) (24.71) (0.34) (22.76) (-24.71) (-22.76) 
        
Market competition in 
the current market 
H4 -0.0117 -6.128*** 0.0117 -6.116*** 6.128*** 6.116*** 
 (-1.52) (-35.44) (1.52) (-35.81) (35.44) (35.81) 
        
Market share  H6 2.313 -1928.8*** -2.313 -1931.1*** 1928.8*** 1931.1*** 
  (0.25) (-38.80) (-0.25) (-38.86) (38.80) (38.86) 
        
Segment share (large 
panels) 
 0.702 146.7*** -0.702 146.0*** -146.7*** -146.0*** 
 (0.40) (9.69) (-0.40) (9.39) (-9.69) (-9.39) 
        
Segment share (small 
panels) 
 -4.468+ -797.4*** 4.468+ -792.9*** 797.4*** 792.9*** 
 (-1.80) (-46.26) (1.80) (-45.78) (46.26) (45.78) 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
  Base: Not move Base: Move toward Base: Move to 
  Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a Model 8b Model 9a Model 9b 
  Move 
towards 
Move to Not move Move to Not move Move 
towards 
 
Constant  -0.369 1179.9*** 0.369 1180.3*** -1179.9*** -1180.3*** 
  (-0.21) (50.41) (0.21) (50.45) (-50.41) (-50.45) 
Observations  146 146 146 146 146 146 
Pseudo R2  0.5118 0.5118 0.5118 0.5118 0.5118 0.5118 
z statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 18. Model estimation by Model 9, large panel segment. 
 
In Model 9, the coefficients of variable segment share (large panels) are negatively 
significant. Figure 18 reports the model estimation by Model 9. In Model 9, a technological 
laggard with a greater share in large panel segment has a higher probability of moving to the 
technology frontier as opposed to moving towards or not moving from its current position. 
 It is worth noting that a technological laggard does have economic incentives to increase 
its share in large panel segment. Moore (1991) proposes that products reputation in the high end 
segment often carry itself over to other lower end segments. Because a product in the high end 
segment is often perceived as having superior technology, a firm's strong presence in the high 
end segment usually has a positive impact on how customers perceive might view the 
technological competitiveness of its products in others segments. Additionally, a high share often 
signals superior product quality (Caminal & Vives; 1996; Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999). Once a 
segment share exceeds a certain threshold, additional shares may serve to perpetuate the 
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perception that it is of superior quality, which is likely to attract more sales. In sum, a 
technological laggard has economic incentives to expand its share in large panel segment.  
Table 12
36
. Plant generations and sizes of panel produced. 
Generation G5 G5.5 G6 G7 G7.5 G8 
Size 
(mmxmm) 
1100x 
1200 
1100x 
1250 
1100x 
1300 
1200x 
1300 
1300x 
1500 
1500x 
1800 
1500x 
1850 
1870x 
2200 
1950x 
2250 
2160x 
2400 
17 9 12 12 12 16 24 25 36 36 -- 
17W 12 12 12 15 18 24 25 35 35 -- 
19 9 9 9 12 12 16 16 25 25 -- 
20.1 6 6 9 9 12 16 18 25 25 -- 
23W 6 6 8 8 8 12 12 21 24 32 
26W 4 6 6 6 8 12 12 18 18 18 
30W 3 3 3 3 6 8 8 12 12 15 
32W 2 2 3 3 4 8 8 12 12 15 
37W 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 8 8 8 
40W 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 8 8 8 
42W 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 6 8 8 
46W 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 6 6 8 
54W 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 6 
57W 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
65W 
    
1 2 2 2 2 3 
 
Producing a larger display panel is one of the keys in driving a technological laggard to 
move to the technology frontier. In Table 12, a higher generation plant can produce larger 
display panels. Some very large panels can only be produced in the most advanced generation 
plant. The findings from Model 7 support this observation. A technological laggard with higher 
share in large panel segment is more likely to build the most advanced generation plant because 
doing so enables it to produce larger display panels.  
  
                                                 
36
 Global Market and Technical Development of Flat Panel Display 2006, Photonics Industry & Technology 
Development Association, Taiwan, p.2-2, Table 2-1-1. 
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Figure 19. Model estimation by Model 7, small panel segment. 
 
In Model 9, the coefficients of variable segment share (small panels) are positively 
significant. The findings from Model 9 suggest that a technological laggard with a greater share 
in small panel segment has a lower probability of moving to the technology frontier as opposed 
to moving towards the technology frontier or not moving from its current position. Furthermore, 
in Model 7, the coefficients of variable segment share (small panels) are negatively significant. 
The findings from Model 7 suggest that a technological laggard with greater share in small panel 
segment has a higher probability of not moving from its current position than other alternative 
moves. Figure 19 summarizes the estimation made by Model 7. A technological laggard's 
probability of not moving from its current position increases with its share in small panel 
segment.  
Although in Table 12 a higher generation plant can produce small panels at greater 
quantity, enabling a technological laggard to achieve economies of scale, findings in Model 9 do 
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not support this economic reasoning. I still maintain the view that the anticipated economic 
payoff may be the explanation. As display panels are usually homogenous products regardless of 
makers, the makers typically have difficulty in increasing the economic payoff through direct 
markup in the market. The actual economic payoff is likely to come from cost savings from 
production. 
Table 13
37
. The substrate area utility by plant generation. 
Generation
38
 G3 G3.5 G3.7 G4 
Substrate size (mm
2
) 550x670 600x720 670x850 750x950 900x1100 
Productivity 
Initial substrate input (1000 units/ month) 35 30 25 20 15 
Cut panels (15”, 18”, 21”) 4, 2, 1 4, 2, 2 6, 4, 2 6, 4, 4 9, 6, 6 
15” panels production volume (1000 
units/ month) 
126 108 135 108 121 
Yield (%) 90 90 90 90 90 
Production volume 1 1-1.2 1-1.2 1-1.3 1-1.5 
Equipment 
costs  
1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 
Investment/ 
costs 
15” 1 0.7 1 0.8 0.9 
18” 1 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Area 
Equipment designed area 1 1.4 1.4 1.5 2 
Area utilization efficiency (15”) 1 1.4 0.9 1 0.9 
 
Table 13 suggests that, when producing small panels (e.g., 15"), a lower generation plant 
may have better productivity. A Gen 3.7 plant can yield more 15" display panels than a Gen 4 
plant
39
. Also, a Gen 3.5 plant has the best area utilization efficiency and the lowest 
investment/cost ratio than higher generation plants. Biing-Seng Wu, Chi Mei Optoelectronics' 
executive vice president, explains CMO's focus on product mix that enables CMO's each plant to 
produce efficiently:   
                                                 
37
 Tian, M. 2008. Flat Panel Display 1999, Cheng-Jin Culture, p.36, Table 6, Taipei, Taiwan 
38
 Generation information is supplied by Technical Development of Flat Panel Displays, p.26, Table 10-1, Wunan 
Book Co., Ltd, Taiwan, 2008 
39
 The same productivity advantage also occurs at higher generation plants. In Harvard Business case Chi Mei 
Optoelectronics, "[a] Gen 5 fab could produce eight 22-inch-wide monitors simultaneously, but a Gen 5.5 could 
produce 12 at a relatively small increase in capital cost. That translated into a huge cost advantage," p. 11. 
93 
 
"[W]e think about how we will cut it in order to minimize the glass wastage and 
produce the product that people want. That is actually the main focus of our 
decision on which generation to build," Shih, Shih, Wang & Yu (2010: 11) 
In addition to the economic reason, the competition within each strategic group provides 
a further explanation as to why a great share in small panel segment discourages a technological 
laggard from moving to the technology frontier, and a great share in large panel segment 
encourages a technological laggard to move to the technology frontier.  
The market segmentation, due to distinct product applications, is likely to divide 
technological laggards into different strategic groups based on the demand features, e.g., panel 
size (Bergen & Peteraf, 2002; Clark & Montgomery, 1999). Hence, not all technological 
laggards expect to face the same characteristics of market competition; managers tend to identify 
rival firms producing similar products and associate those rival firms into their strategic group 
(Bergen & Peteraf, 2002; Clark & Montgomery, 1999; Porac & Thomas, 1990).  
Clark and Montgomery (1999) posit that firms tend to imitate actions by successful firms. 
Hence, for a technological laggard with a great share in large panel segment is more inclined to 
identify the technological leader who produces large panels and follows the leader's technology 
deployment decision. Because firms in the same strategic group tend to react in the same way 
toward external threats (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Smith et al., 1997), a laggard producing 
more large panels is likely to choose the same technology deployment decision as the 
technological leader, who usually prioritizes its initiatives with the intent to maintain its 
technological lead.   
Although the pattern of competition is usually similar within strategic group, the acutal 
actions taken between strategic groups are usually different (Mas-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 2011). A 
technological laggard with a great share in small panel segment is more likely to form its 
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strategic group with other technological laggards who mainly manufacture small panels (Porac & 
Thomas, 1990). Different strategic groups usually have different target performance levels 
(Fiegenbaum, Hart & Schendel, 1996; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990). Based on information 
provided by industry reports, a laggard producing small panels tends to emphasize profitability. 
As such, a laggard in the strategic group of small panels is more likely to set its goal to improve 
manufacturing process to achieve better production yield than, say, to pursue the technological 
leadership.  
It is worth noting that findings from a model that incorporates segment shares can help to 
resolve the debate over whether a market share encourages more innovations. When a 
technological laggard has a high share in a segment that is prone to innovate, it usually chooses 
to deploy the more advanced technology that directly responds to the demand characteristics in 
the segment. Conversely, if the segment where a laggard has a high share is less innovation 
driven, the exhibition of inertia is likely to be more prominent regarding its decision of deploying 
the more advanced technology.   
6.2 Dual Technological Trajectories  
So far this study has assumed that there is only one technological trajectory (LCD 
technology only). This assumption nevertheless leads to a cylindrical view (Dosi, 1982). In the 
flat panel display industry, the OLED technology is considered to be the next dominant 
technology after the LCD technology. The current technological laggards using the LCD 
technology have evolved a different behavior in response to the rise of the OLED technology. At 
here, I highlight two characteristics of LCD and OLED technologies to facilitate the following 
post-hoc analysis. First, a display panel produced using the LCD or the OLED technology may 
vary in some technical aspects, but product applications are greatly overlapped. Hence, in most 
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cases the market demand for display panels varies marginally with the type of technology used. 
Second, the relationship between the LCD and OLED technologies is more of complementary 
one than a substitute one.  
Table 14. Technological leaders and laggards' firm-year observations by technology. 
 
      LCD   
    Laggard Leader Total 
 
No Entry 648 145 793 
OLED Entry 32 1
40
 33 
  Total 680 146 826 
  
This part of post-hoc analysis focuses on LCD technological laggards who also produce 
display panels using the OLED technology. Table 14 presents data outlook. Only 32 LCD 
technological laggards produce OLED display panels. Despite a small number of observations, 
the phenomenon of a firm, especially a technologically lagging firm, producing products using 
technologies from different technological trajectories lacks theoretical explanations (Christensen, 
1997). Further, most research literature has assumed that one technological trajectory replaces 
another sooner or later (Adner & Zemsky, 2005; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995); whereas the 
LCD and OLED technologies are two technological trajectories complementary to each other 
regarding their technical features and product applications.  
The OLED is a relatively nascent technology in the flat panel display industry. With the 
first mass production by Pioneer takes place in 1997
41
, the production of display panels using the 
OLED technology gradually does not take off until 2004. The observation period for the dataset 
                                                 
40
 Although there is only one LCD technological leader using the OLED technology in the same year during the 
observation period, there are sister firms or firms in alliance with the technological leaders in the LCD and OLED 
technologies. They are Samsung Electronics & Samsung SDI in 2005, and 2008, and S-LCD & Samsung SDI in 
2006. S-LCD is the joint venture by Sony and Samsung Electronics.  
41
 OLEDs: The History and Future Trends, Mike Hack, Universal Display Corporation. Source: 
apps1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/publications/pdfs/ssl/hack.pdf 
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(year 1997 to 2007) partially covers this mass production period, which allows me to study the 
competitive dynamics of the OLED technology at its early stage. 
In examining the likelihood of an LCD technological laggard producing display panels 
using the OLED technology, I define a binomial dependent variable as 1 if an LCD technological 
laggard produces display panels using the OLED technology in a given year, and 0 if it does not. 
Models 10-11 maintain the same independent and control variables from Model 1 (simple 
model). In the following I highlight the major findings from the models. Models 10-11 are 
random-effect logistic models. Furthermore, survival analysis can be a suitable model in 
analyzing a technological laggard's decision to enter the OLED technological trajectory. To 
ensure model robustness, I choose to let Models 12-13 be Cox proportional hazards model with 
the same independent and control variables from Models 10-11.  
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Table 15. Random-effect logistic model & Cox proportional hazards model; Dependent 
variable is 1 when a technological laggard's enters OLED, and is 0 when not; hazard is the entry 
of OLED technological trajectory.  
  Random-effect logistic Cox proportional hazard 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Interfirm relationships  2.893 2.895 35.938 23.543 
  (0.92) (0.75) (1.45) (1.32) 
      
Industry growth  7.968* 7.159* 1541.942* 943.546* 
  (2.35) (2.14) (2.25) (2.10) 
      
Firm age  -0.0447 -0.0817 0.881 0.8828 
  (-0.43) (-0.73) (-1.27) (-1.26) 
      
Firm size   0.000787+ 0.0000388 1.0005 1.00008 
 (1.71) (0.08) (1.04) (0.15) 
      
Technology frontier 
competition 
 -1.720** -1.656** 0.5297 0.6351 
 (-2.73) (-2.59) (-1.12) (-0.79) 
      
Patent stock   0.0000877 0.00003 1.00004 1.00003 
 (0.75) (0.23) (0.49) (0.30) 
      
Recent move  0.0496 0.0699 0.9618 0.9989 
 (0.47) (0.64) (-0.42) (-0.01) 
      
Current generation   1.363*** 1.500*** 2.986** 4.1994** 
 (3.29) (3.58) (2.69) (3.07) 
      
Number of plants  0.228 0.169 1.052 0.9550 
  (1.56) (1.09) (0.43) (-0.33) 
      
Number of 
generations moved 
 -0.521 -0.359 0.6923 0.6633 
 (-0.93) (-0.64) (-0.79) (-0.88) 
      
Distance to the (LCD) 
technology frontier 
H1 0.776* 0.766* 2.009* 1.9645+ 
 (2.30) (2.24) (2.02) (1.91) 
      
Innovation momentum 
 
H2 0.228 0.0951 0.9114 0.8233 
 (0.66) (0.26) (-0.29) (-0.57) 
      
Experience at the 
technology frontier 
H3 0.0000637 0.000301 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.12) (0.53) (0.26) (0.22) 
      
Prior window of 
competitive response 
H4 -0.00415 -0.00449 0.9967 0.9964 
 (-1.44) (-1.54) (-1.28) (-1.35) 
      
Market competition in 
the current market 
H4 0.0202+ 0.0246* 1.013 1.0201+ 
 (1.90) (2.15) (1.23) (1.69) 
      
Market share  H6 -61.49+ -54.74+ 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.15) (-1.02) 
      
Distance*market share   25.18*  14754.6+ 
  (2.37)  (1.55) 
      
Constant  -11.94*** -12.15***   
  (-3.60) (-3.71)   
Observations  516 516 516 516 
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z statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In Table 15, Model 10's the variable distance to the (LCD) technology frontier is 
positively significant. Model 10 suggests that a technological laggard that is further behind the 
technology frontier of LCD is likely to enter the OLED technological trajectory. Model 12 
reports the same finding as Model 10. From the perspective of capabilities, technological 
capabilities that an LCD technological laggard has may be applicable for developing the OLED 
technology. Hence a technological laggard can use its knowledge in LCD to develop the OLED 
technology.  
The positive and significant coefficient of market competition in Model 11 and 13 lends 
support to the view that a technological laggard enters the OLED technological trajectory with 
the intention of seeking a less competitive market. From the perspective of competitive dynamics, 
products using the OLED technology generally experience lower competition than those using 
the LCD technology during the observation period. A technological laggard may be more 
inclined to invest in a less competitive market where return on innovation is likely to be higher 
(Cool & Dierickx, 1993). Thus, a technological laggard can expect to achieve a better economic 
payoff by producing products using the OLED technology.  
Hypothesis development and post-hoc analysis both maintain that the market share also 
affects a technological laggard's technology deployment decisions. Hence, in addition to distance 
to the technology frontier, a market share may also determine an LCD laggard's likelihood of 
deploying the OLED technology. Model 11 examines the interactive effect of distance and 
market share on the likelihood of an LCD laggard producing display panels using the OLED 
technology.   
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Figure 20. Model estimation by Model 11. 
 
 
In Model 11, the variable distance*market share is positively significant. The market 
share enhances the positive effect of distance on a technological laggard's likelihood of entering 
the OLED technological trajectory. In Figure 20, when a technological laggard has a greater 
market share in the LCD technological trajectory, the distance to the technology frontier has a 
stronger positive effect on its likelihood of entering the OLED technological trajectory.  
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Figure 21. Survival analysis model estimation by Model 13. 
 
Model 13 (Cox proportional hazard model) lends further support to Model 11. As shown 
in Figure 21, a technological laggard is more likely to enter the OLED technological trajectory 
when its distance and market share are both higher.  
As a whole, a technological laggard with a great market share is likely to carry on 
innovating to maintain its market share; a technological laggard that is further behind the LCD 
technology frontier usually has difficulty moving to or towards the LCD technology frontier due 
to capabilities constraints and competitive dynamics. Taken together, if an LCD technological 
laggard that is further behind the LCD technology frontier plans to maintain or gain more market 
share, producing display panels using the OLED technology may help it to work around 
technological difficulties and market competition. Thus, entering the OLED technological 
trajectory becomes a technological laggard's strategic response to its lagging position in the LCD 
technological trajectory (Mitchell, 1989). In the following discussions, I incorporate more 
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industry information from the flat panel display industry to further explain an LCD technological 
laggard's decision to enter the OLED technological trajectory.  
Figure 22
42
. OLED technology and its product applications. 
 
During the observation period (from 1997 to 2007), the competition among product using 
the OLED technology has been comparatively lower than the LCD technology due to its newness 
to the industry. Figure 22 provides a temporal view of the application and size growth of display 
panel using the OLED technology. Before 2007, the OLED technology is still a technology used 
almost exclusively in producing panels with size smaller than 11", a size normally considered 
small by the standard in the LCD technology trajectory. Therefore, an LCD technological 
laggard with most of its production in small display panels, is usually positioned further behind 
                                                 
42
 Tian, M. 2008. Global Market and Technical Development of Flat Panel Display 2008, Photonics Industry & 
Technology Development Association, p.4-27, figure 4-2-5, Taiwan  
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the technology frontier, and is more likely to enter the OLED technological trajectory to capture 
a piece of the market demand of which it has a high share.  
The organizational capabilities view helps explain why an LCD technological laggard 
attempts to enter the OLED technological trajectory. First, it is possible for a laggard to develop 
a technology based upon its existing knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2004; Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel 
& Tsai, 1996; Khessina & Carroll, 2008). For example, a number of flat panel makers are 
semiconductor makers prior to their entry into the flat panel display industry. The similarity 
between semiconductor manufacturing and flat panel display manufacturing enables the makers 
to achieve such technological transition. Likewise, the technical similarity
43
 between LCD and 
OLED enables an LCD technological laggard to develop display panels using the OLED 
technology, and may even do so at lower costs (Dixit, 1989; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Second, an LCD technological laggard's knowledge of rivals and market can be a 
complementary capability when it enters the OLED technological trajectory. An LCD laggard 
that is already producing large volume of small panels is likely to be more capable of managing 
the market competition, because it knows the terms of competition specific to small panel market 
segment. Additionally, an LCD laggard is likely to encounter the same rivals who produce small 
panels using the LCD technology. A laggard's prior experience with the same rivals can help it to 
better manage the market competition (Bergen & Peteraf, 2002). On the flip side, an LCD 
laggard is likely to sell its OLED display panels to the same firms who are the buyer of its LCD 
display panels. An LCD laggard may produce products using the OLED technology to strengthen 
its market position in small panel market segment.  
                                                 
43
 Iwai, Y., 2002, The Key Components, Materials, and Skills of Flat Panel Display, Kogyo Chosakai Publishing Co., 
Ltd, Japan 
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Furthermore, a technological laggard generally has economic incentives to increase its 
sales in small panels as well. The flat panel display industry has undergone volatile industry 
cycles
44
.  The industry sales of medium to large panels often turn sluggish due to the weakened 
demand in other industries, such as the personal computer industry. Compared with fickle 
demand for medium and large panels, the demand for small panels has been more stable due to 
extremely diversified product applications, including watches, mobile devices, game machines 
(e.g., Pachinko), and so on
45
. The stable and strong market demand can encourage a 
technological laggard who already commands a high share of small panel segment to adopt other 
technologies to better capture an even larger piece of the market.  
Taken together, a combined view of organizational capabilities and competitive dynamics 
offers theoretical explanations as to answer why an LCD technological laggard chooses to 
produce display panels using the OLED technology. A technological laggard is likely to choose 
to pursue dual (LCD and OLED) technological trajectories to leverage of its existing 
organizational capabilities, and strengthen its position in key segments of the market.   
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 Zhang, B. 2007. Global TFT LCD Panel and Driver IC outlook, presented at Yokogawa Shanghai Conference, 
Shanghai, China.  
45
 Flat-panel displays: Cracking up, The Economist, Jan 17th 2012.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
This dissertation asks the research question: What determines by how much, if at all, 
technological laggards advance towards the technology frontier? This study builds on work in 
firm capabilities and competitive dynamics to examine a technological laggard’s technology 
deployment decision. The firm capabilities research, with its inward-looking focus, examines a 
technological laggard's capabilities to innovate; while the competitive dynamics research, with a 
focus on external conditions, examines a technological laggard's anticipated economic payoff 
from innovation. The model in this study combines the firm capabilities and competitive 
dynamics researches and provides a more complete model that can be helpful in explaining and 
predicting a technological laggard's innovation behavior (Ndofor et al., 2011).  
The empirical testing in the flat panel display industry provides support for the proposed 
theoretical model. Support for the theoretical model suggests that both organizational capabilities 
and the anticipated economic payoff jointly determine a technological laggard's decision as to 
whether to attempt to move to the technology frontier. A laggard is more likely to choose to 
remain lagging if doing so enables it to better utilize its current organizational capabilities, and if 
it anticipates a better economic payoff by remaining a technological laggard than by becoming a 
technological leader. Conversely, the experience at the technology frontier is especially 
conducive to encouraging a laggard to move to the technology frontier. The experience at the 
technology frontier not only motivates a laggard to move to the technology frontier, but also 
enables it to develop organizational capabilities that can help it manage the competition at the 
technology frontier.  
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The current study develops a theoretical model that includes internal and external factors. 
Strong empirical support of firm-level hypotheses (H1-3) and insignificant statistical results from 
environment-level hypotheses (H4-5) suggest that organizational characteristics may carry a 
heavier weight on influencing a technological laggard's technology deployment decision, 
underscoring the role of the focal firm's capability in the competitive dynamics literature. The 
empirical findings from this dissertation complement the competitive dynamics literature by 
suggesting that, at the dual presence of organizational capabilities and the competition in the 
environment, organizational capabilities are more likely to be a dominant factor in determining a 
firm's competitive behavior with respect to technology deployment.   
Due to insignificant statistical results of H4-6, I conduct post-hoc analyses in an effort to 
complete the theories for laggard strategy. In the analysis of segment share, the formation of 
strategic group based on product characteristics is rather clear. In essence, a technological 
laggard that associates itself with the technological leader shows the tendency towards deploying 
the more advanced technology, and attempts on the technological leadership; whereas a 
technological laggard in a strategic group in which firms produces products using less advanced 
technology demonstrates inertia towards innovating. In the analysis of technological trajectory, I 
infer from the empirical findings that technological lagging behind the technology frontier is a 
critical factor that leads an LCD technological laggard to pursue dual technological trajectories. 
Complementarity makes it convenient for a laggard to simultaneously operate with the LCD and 
OLED technologies. The potential economic payoff from a greater share in a given segment 
augments economic incentive for a laggard to undertake the technological risk in developing 
dual technological trajectories.  
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In summary, the internal factors in the theoretical model can explain and predict a 
technological laggard's technology deployment decision. The empirical findings underscore the 
importance of the focal firm's capability how organizational capabilities are conducive to 
competitive actions. Although external factors do not receive statistical support, post-hoc 
analysis finds convincing evidence to support external factors' influence on a laggard's 
technology deployment decision. Segment share is a better proxy than market share when it 
comes to predicting a laggard's technology deployment decision because it distinguishes a 
laggard's economic incentives to innovate based on strategic groups. The prediction is 
corroborated when the analysis considers dual technological trajectories. Thus, to substantiate 
our understanding of laggard strategy, we need to understand both internal and external factors.  
7.1 Limitations  
This dissertation has several limitations. As is the case in studies that employ data from a 
single industry, the findings may be limited in terms of its generalizability to other industries that 
has little in common with the flat panel display industry. Yet, this study is generalizable to 
industries with similar technical setting, such as the disk-drive industry (Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Christensen, 1997) and the printer industry (de Figueiredo & Teece, 1996). Furthermore, a 
technological laggard's two strategic actions--moving to and beyond the technology frontier are 
combined as one single move, because theories from the firm capabilities and competitive 
dynamics researches do not distinguish predictions in this regard. A goal for future research may 
incorporate first mover advantage literature to dissect the firm behavior at the technology frontier 
and what leads to the advancing of the technology frontier. Moreover, the empirical proxy for 
market competition is not perfect. Given that the hypothesized prediction is grounded in well-
established literature, it is possible that the currently less than perfect proxy for market 
108 
 
competition causes statistical insignificance. Future research can adopt a methodological solution 
that can not only approximate but also distinguish between market and technological competition. 
This approach will help researchers make progress on technology competition study.  
7.2 Future Research 
Examining a technological laggard's competitive behavior and the technological leader's 
strategic responses to technological laggard's technology deployment decision through the lens 
of real options theory is a topic worthwhile undertaking (Trigeorgis, 1996). Conner (1986) 
suggests that the technological leader uses wait strategies. The technological leader may be better 
off waiting until a technological laggard attempts to surpass it (Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; 
Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010). If a technological laggard does not move to the technology frontier, 
the introduction of new product may be delayed, or never occurred (Smit & Ankum, 1993).  
Indeed, a technological leader's technology deployment decision is to an extent influenced by 
other technological laggards' strategic moves. 
On a broader scale, it is worth examining the causality between the degree of supply 
chain integration and a firm's technology deployment decision. This line of study contributes to 
technology industries where innovation is often the result of collective acts. Some firms produce 
invention, and some firms commercialize it
46
 (Roberts, 2007). Patent house such as RISC in the 
mobile computing industry, and CREE and Cambridge Display in flat panel display industry is a 
promising business model, to which management scholars have paid little attention. The 
adoption of interdependency view helps to examine how interfirm relationships affect a 
technological laggard's technology deployment decision. On one hand, interfirm relationships 
generally facilitate the flow of knowledge and increase a laggard's innovation output. On the 
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 Technology=invention + commercialization  
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other hand, a laggard may refrain from moving ahead of its partner to avoid competitive 
responses. The tension within the literature in this regard has not been inadequately addressed.   
Finally, it would also be useful to explore different strategies that a technological laggard 
can or shall use besides moving towards or to the technology frontier (Christensen & 
Rosenbloom, 1995). For instance, when the technological leader's technology is too cutting-edge, 
a technological laggard may opt to shadow the technological leader rather than move to the 
technology frontier. The current model of organizational capabilities and economic incentive 
may be useful to study how a technological leader can become a laggard, and vice versa.  
7.3 Contributions 
Most technology studies consider innovation and competition (Adner & Zemsky, 2005; 
Aghion et al., 2005; Gilbert, 2006; Horner, 2003; Tang, 2006; Vaaler & McNamara, 2010), or 
considers innovation and organizational capabilities (Berry, 2006; Blundell et al., 1999; de 
Figueiredo & Teece, 1996; Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005). This dissertation contributes to the 
literature by simultaneously considering firm capabilities, competition, and innovation, which is 
a rather unique approach that only a few studies have adopted before (Leiblein & Madsen, 2009).  
Support for the theoretical model in the current study contributes to the extant literature 
in several ways. Following Lerner (1997) that uses technological capabilities to explain the 
relationship between firms and the technology frontier, this dissertation helps to explain and 
predict how a technological laggard's organizational capabilities affects its position relative to 
technology frontier. The empirical findings underscore the role of the focal firm's organizational 
capabilities in the competitive dynamics research (Lamberg et al., 2009; Sirmon et al., 2007). 
The move of technological laggard depends not only on the strength of its capabilities but also on 
the types of capabilities that it has.  
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This dissertation contributes to the competitive dynamics literature by highlighting 
special circumstances where market competition effectively encourages a technological laggard 
to innovate. Highlighting these special circumstances helps to resolve the conflicting predictions 
on whether the competition leads to more innovation (Aghion et al., 2001; Tang, 2006). 
Furthermore, this dissertation also contributes to studies on organization decision making. 
Empirical results in this dissertation suggest that a technological laggard is indeed able to behave 
rationally in deciding which technology to deploy so that it can achieve the anticipated economic 
payoff. An economic rationale introduced in this dissertation also resolves the debate on whether 
a large market share leads to inertia or innovation momentum.     
Lastly, this dissertation provides useful managerial implications for managers at the 
technological lagging firms. Laggard firms are often the majority in an industry. The 
implications from this dissertation directly address the issues managers in these laggard firms 
may face. The broader implication of this study for technology strategy is that technological 
laggards are a distinct, yet heterogeneous group, where the anticipated economic payoff largely 
determines whether to attempt to move to the technology frontier. Beyond that, this study also 
highlights the capability heterogeneity among technological laggards. Addressing the issue of 
heterogeneity helps to explain and predict a laggard's firm behavior with respect to technology 
deployment. Future research on technological laggards will need to branch out from firm 
capabilities and competitive dynamics researches to further develop the laggard strategy.  
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